HELENE POWELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Powell appealed her first-degree murder conviction, challenging the sufficiency of evidence, alleged trial court errors in responding to jury questions, and a denied motion for new trial based on a juror's post-verdict recantation. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding the evidence sufficient and the juror's renunciation inadmissible under Florida law.
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that: (1) sufficient legal evidence supported the guilty verdict; (2) the alleged errors regarding jury questions were not preserved for review due to lack of objection; and (3) the juror's recantation was inadmissible because it concerned matters that essentially inhere in the verdict itself, such as her failure to assent to the verdict and undue influence by fellow jurors.
[1] Legally sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict is a valid basis for refusing to direct a verdict and enter a judgment for the appellant.
[2] Alleged errors concerning the trial judge's responses to jury questions during deliberations are not preserved for review if the appellant's counsel agreed to the procedu…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“That affidavits of jurors may be received for the purpose of voiding a verdict, to show any matter occurring during the trial or in the jury room, which does not essentially inhere in the verdict itself, as that a juror was improperly approached by a party, his agent, or attorney; that witnesses or others conversed as to the facts or merits of the cause, out of court and in the presence of jurors; that the verdict was determined by aggregation and average or by lot, or game of chance or other artifice or improper manner; but that such affidavit to avoid the verdict may not be received to show any manner which does essentially inhere in the verdict itself, as that the juror did not assent to the verdict; that he misunderstood the instructions of the Court; the statements of the witnesses or the pleadings in the case, that he was unduly influenced by the statements or otherwise of his fellow-jurors, or mistaken in his calculations or judgment, or other manner resting alone in the juror's breast.”
Establishes the foundational rule governing when juror affidavits can be used to overturn a verdict, distinguishing between external improper contacts and internal mental processes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePowell was convicted of first-degree murder. During jury deliberations, the jury posed two questions to the trial court. After the verdict was announc…
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DAUKSCH, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder in the first degree.
The first question on appeal is whether the court erred in refusing to direct a verdict and enter a judgment for the appellant. It is appellant’s allegation that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the guilty verdict. After having closely examined the record we find there is sufficient legal evidence to support the verdict. Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla.1981).
Two other questions for us to consider concern the manner in which the trial judge responded to two questions posed to the court by the jury during their deliberations. Those alleged errors were not preserved on the record for our review. In the first instance, appellant’s counsel agreed to the procedure and in the second instance appellant did not object. See Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701 (Fla.1978).
The final question raised on appeal concerns a denial of a motion for new trial. A juror who voted to convict appellant and who confirmed her verdict in court after it was announced, later appeared to say she did not really mean to vote to convict. She said she had felt intimidated by the other jurors during the deliberations because they had prompted her to hurry up, saying also that there was no sense in her causing a hung jury. She also said she was impelled to her verdict because several jurors had complained about the lateness of the hour since they had been deliberating from noon until nine o’clock. She said she would not have voted to convict had the circumstances been different and she reluctantly confirmed her verdict in open court because “Maybe I thought I might be laughed at or they would want a long explanation as to why. I really didn’t know how to explain my feeling. Just a lot of mixed feelings and not sure at that time of what to do about them.”
The rule announced by the Supreme Court of Florida concerning a juror’s renunciation of her verdict is:
That affidavits of jurors may be received for the purpose of voiding a verdict, to show any matter occurring during the trial or in the jury room, which does not essentially inher in the verdict itself, as that a juror was improperly approached by a party, his agent, or attorney; that witnesses or others conversed as to the facts or merits of the cause, out of court and in the presence of jurors; that the verdict was determined by aggregation and average or by lot, or game of chance or other artifice or improper manner; but that such affidavit to avoid the verdict may not be received to show any manner which does essentially inhere in the verdict itself, as that the juror did not assent to the verdict; that he misunderstood the instructions of the Court; the statements of the witnesses or the pleadings in the case, that he was unduly influenced by the statements or otherwise of his fellow-jurors, or mistaken in his calculations or judgment, or other manner resting alone in the juror’s breast.
Marks v. State Road Department, 69 So. 2d 771, 774-75 (Fla.1954).
See also State v. Ramirez, 73 So. 2d 218 (Fla.1954); Crapps v. Murchek, 330 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
Upon a review of the juror’s testimony and a consideration of the rule relating to these matters, we cannot disagree with the decision of the trial judge to deny the new trial.
AFFIRMED.
SHARP and COWART, JJ., concur.
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Sentinel Commc'ns Co. v. Hon. John W. Watson, III, 615 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…Froehlich, 582 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (impressions of jurors as to why reached verdict); Robinson v. MacKenzie, 508 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 518 So. 2d 1276 (Fla.1987) (verdict based on misapprehension of law); Powell v. State, 414 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (juror said she didn’t mean to convict but felt intimidated and hurried). Concerning the court’s order prohibiting discussion of the proceedings, prior restraint comes to the court with a heavy burden in the form of a presumptio…
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State v. Devoney, 675 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…Transp. v. Rejrat, 540 So. 2d 911, 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (allegation jury misunderstood comparative negligence); Darby v. State, 461 So. 2d 984, 984-85 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (allegation foreperson improperly influenced other jurors); Powell v. State, 414 So. 2d 1095, 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (allegation juror pressured by lateness of the hour and intimidated by others not to “hang” jury); Parker v. State, 336 So. 2d 426, 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (allegation juror changed mind after hearing sentence); Branch v. S…
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State v. Helene Powell, 460 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…During trial she properly moved for a judgment of acquittal based upon the alleged insufficiency of the evidence. She moved for a new trial after she was found guilty. Both of these were denied, so she appealed the denials. She lost the appeal. See 414 So. 2d 1095. After losing her appeal she filed a motion to vacate the judgment under Rule 3.850 and said she would not have been convicted if the original trial judge, who was not the one hearing the motion to vacate, had not been confused about the law relati…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1978)
- Delbert Lee Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981)
- Marks v. State Rd. Dep't, 69 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1954)
- State v. Ramirez, 73 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1954)
- Crapps v. Murchek, 330 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)