BLONDINE T. POPE, DON POPE, JAMES TURBEVILLE, GLADYS TURBEVILLE, SHANNON D. CAMPBELL, PHILIP H. CAMPBELL, GLENDA GAIL CAMPBELL, TROY L. WINGET, AND LOVALINE WINGET, APPELLANTS,
v.
CARL HANKINS, INC. AND MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
This case involves an appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of a property owner. The court found that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the property owner's alleged negligence in maintaining a wooden barrier that obstructed visibility at an intersection, thus reversing the summary judgment.
The court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the depositions of witnesses raised a material issue of fact concerning the barrier's effect on visibility at the intersection.
[1] Summary judgment should not be granted in negligence cases unless the moving party demonstrates no genuine issue of material fact exists, resolving all reasonable inferen…
[2] An issue of material fact regarding the effect of a property barrier on visibility at an intersection can preclude summary judgment in a negligence action.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well settled that summary judgment should not be granted, especially in negligence cases, unless the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of any material fact which, if taken in a light most favorable to the nohmoving party, would entitle the nonmoving party to relief.”
This quote establishes the legal standard for granting summary judgment, particularly in negligence cases, which the court found was not met by the appellees.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePassengers in a van sued a property owner, Carl Hankins, Inc., alleging that a wooden barrier on Hankins' property obstructed the view at an intersect…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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BOARDMAN, Judge.
This is an appeal of a final summary judgment in favor of defendants Carl Han-kins, Inc. (Hankins) and Maryland Casualty Company, Hankins’ insurance carrier. The lawsuit arose out of an intersection collision between a northbound van in which appellants were passengers and an eastbound automobile driven by Maxine Risley.1 Appellants alleged that Hankins failed to maintain its property, which was on the southwest corner of the intersection, in a safe condition in that a wooden barrier bordering the edge of the property obstructed the view to the west of northbound drivers and the view to the south of eastbound drivers, and that appellants’ injuries were a direct and proximate result of this negligence on Hankins’ part. Appellees moved for summary judgment on the ground that the negligence of one or both drivers was the sole proximate cause of the accident, which motion was granted.
It is well settled that summary judgment should not be granted, especially in negligence cases, unless the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of any material fact which, if taken in a light most favorable to the nohmoving party, would entitle the nonmoving party to relief. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966). All reasonable inferences must be resolved against the movant. Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 182 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). Appellees here have not met their burden. The depositions of the investigating police officer and other witnesses raise an issue of material fact concerning the wooden barrier’s effect on visibility at the intersection in question. See Cook v. Martin, 330 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 339 So. 2d 1170 (Fla.1976) (holding that an issue of material fact was raised concerning the effect of certain shrubbery located on defendant’s premises on visibility of someone leaving those premises).
Accordingly, the final summary judgment is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings.
HOBSON, A. C. J., and RYDER, J., concur. . Not a party to this appeal.
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Johnson v. Howard Mark Prods., Inc., 608 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…tion. Although a landowner is most commonly liable for injuries that occur on the property, there are occasions when a landowner may be liable for a dangerous condition that results in injury off the premises. See, e.g., Pope v. Carl Hankins, Inc., 411 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (summary judgment premature where defendant’s wooden barrier may have obstructed visibility and caused accident on adjacent highway); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (owner of lounge may be liab…
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Cushen v. Grossman Holdings, Ltd., 424 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…case. We do not believe, as the appellant suggests, that Evans and this decision are in constitutional direct conflict with Cook v. Martin, 330 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. denied, 339 So. 2d 1170 (Fla.1976), or Pope v. Carl Hankins, Inc., 411 So. 2d 898 (Fla.2d DCA 1982) and therefore will not certify to that effect pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(vi). Art. V § 3(b)(4), Fla.Const.1 Affirmed. . We note that if the supreme court disagrees, it may review the decision, even in the absence…
Authorities Cited
- Gory Roofing Tile Mfg., Inc. v. Davison, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1966)
- Rivers v. Ross, 182 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Cook v. Martin, 330 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)