JO DAVIDSON, APPELLANT,
v.
MURRAY DAVIDSON, APPELLEE
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The dissenting opinion argues that a court of equity may refuse to foreclose a mortgage when the mortgagee has a history of accepting late payments and the acceleration of the debt is not due to an impairment of the lender's security.
The dissenting judge believes foreclosure should not have been ordered due to the lender's history of accepting late payments and the lack of demonstrated impairment to the lender's security.
[1] An award of alimony designated as "lump sum" may be considered permanent periodic alimony if it is payable in installments over a fixed period.
[2] It is error to condition the termination of permanent periodic alimony on the occurrence of an uncertain future event, such as eligibility for social security benefits.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe mortgagee had a history of accepting late payments from the mortgagor and their predecessors in title. The lender eventually accelerated the loan …
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OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr. (Retired) Associate Judge.
After dissolving the twenty-two year marriage of the parties, the court entered a separate judgment relating to monetary matters by which he awarded the fifty year old wife “lump sum” alimony in the amount of $124,800, payable $200 per week for twelve years, at which time the wife, at age sixty-two, would become eligible for social security benefits. Not dissatisfied with the amount of the weekly award of alimony, the wife nonetheless contends that the alimony should have been awarded on a permanent periodic basis rather than as a lump sum. Although the award was designated as lump sum alimony, we conceive it to be permanent periodic alimony of $200 per week for a total of twelve years. Whether the wife will commence receiving social security benefits at age sixty-two and, if so, whether the amount of such benefits will adequately meet her needs, cannot and should not be determined at this time. It is error to provide for a change or termination of permanent or periodic alimony based on the anticipated occurrence of an uncertain future event. See, e.g., Eskridge v. Eskridge, 381 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Garrison v. Garrison, 380 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); McCloskey v. McCloskey, 359 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
The award of “lump sum” alimony is modified to an award of permanent periodic alimony payable $200 per week. As thus modified, the monetary benefits payable to the wife by the provisions of the final judgment are affirmed.
The court awarded to the wife an equitable lien on certain real property awarded to the husband for the purpose of securing the wife’s award of lump sum alimony. In view of our changing the alimony award from lump sum to permanent periodic alimony, an equitable lien on the husband’s real property to secure the payment of such alimony is not required by the facts of this case and to that extent the judgment is reversed.
In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
REVERSED IN PART and AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED IN PART.
ANSTEAD and BERANEK, JJ., concur.
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Thilem v. Thilem, 662 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…ernberg, 320 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). To limit the duration of permanent periodic alimony or require review of the award in a certain number of years is error. See Colletti v. Colletti, 411 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Davidson v. Davidson, 410 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 421 So. 2d 67 (Fla.1982). Second, the trial court must reevaluate the child support award. The child support guidelines require the trial court to impute income to a voluntarily underemployed parent’s earnings. § 6…
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Hamilton v. Hamilton, 552 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…disfavored as there is no evidentiary basis for the determination of future events, and there exists an adequate procedure for modification when changes in the circumstances of the parties do occur. 440 So. 2d at 46. See also Davidson v. Davidson, 410 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (change or termination of permanent or periodic alimony based on the anticipated occurrence of an uncertain future event is error). [*932] Accordingly, we hold that the provision of the final judgment awarding as permanent period…
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Hitt v. Hitt, 571 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)…amount was to be automatically reduced to $1,100 per month. As we have previously held, it is error to provide for an automatic, future change or termination of alimony based upon the anticipated occurrence of a future event. Davidson v. Davidson, 410 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). We note, without deciding, that there may be exceptions to this rule. See Rao v. Rao, 501 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). It is reasonably clear, however, that there can be no provision for an automatic change in the amount of ali…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McCLOSKEY v. McCLOSKEY, 359 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Garrison v. Garrison, 380 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Eskridge v. Eskridge, 381 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)