JUAN AMPUERO, M.D., APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A physician challenged an emergency order prohibiting him from prescribing controlled substances. The court found that the delay of nearly six months between the emergency restriction and a hearing on the merits violated due process, and quashed the order.
The court held that the delay constituted a denial of due process and violated the standards established in Barry v. Barchi and Aurora Enterprises v. State. The court quashed the emergency order of restriction.
[1] A physician's privilege to prescribe scheduled substances may be temporarily restricted by the Department of Professional Regulation based on preliminary findings of pres…
[2] A licensee is not entitled to an immediate hearing on an administrative complaint following an emergency order of restriction; such an order is typically reviewable only…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the state undertook to temporarily restrict the petitioner's privilege to practice medicine it had an affirmative duty to grant a post-suspension hearing and one that would be concluded without appreciable delay.”
Establishes the state's constitutional obligation when imposing emergency professional restrictions
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDr. Ampuero was issued an emergency order on September 8, 1981, prohibiting him from prescribing scheduled substances, based on allegations that he pr…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Controlled Substance cases and more on FLexlaw
FERGUSON, Judge.
Appellant, a physician, seeks review of an emergency order of the Department of Professional Regulation which prohibits him from prescribing any scheduled substances as defined by Chapter 893.03, Florida Statutes.1 The order of September 8, 1981 is based on a preliminary finding that between December 16, 1980 and May 26, 1981, petitioner prescribed Methaqualone and Ativan, both controlled substances, in excessive amounts, without “good faith”, and outside “the course of his professional duties.”
Appellant requested an immediate hearing on the administrative complaint and was given a hearing date of October 22, 1981. Thereafter on October 12, 1981 appellant was informed by the Department of Administrative Hearings that there was no right to an immediate hearing on the administrative complaint and that the order of emergency restriction was a final order reviewable only in the District Court of Appeal. A Petition for Stay of the order of emergency restriction was filed in this court October 16, 1981 and was denied without hearing.
Petitioner then filed an appeal in this court from the denial of an immediate hearing on the administrative complaint. On the date that the last brief was filed in this matter — December 28, 1981 — a hearing on the administrative complaint was still not scheduled though some one hundred and twelve days had elapsed. At the time of hearing on this appeal, which we treat as a renewed motion to stay the order of emergency restriction, there has been a hearing on the administrative complaint but still no disposition. Almost six months have now elapsed.
We find the circumstances of this delay more egregious than was the case in Aurora Enterprises v. State, Department of Professional Regulation, 395 So. 2d 604 (Fla.3d DCA 1981) wherein we held that a fifty-day delay between the date of temporary suspension of a license and hearing on a complaint for revocation was a denial of due process. When the state undertook to temporarily restrict the petitioner’s privilege to practice medicine it had an affirmative duty to grant a post-suspension hearing and one that would be concluded without appreciable delay. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979). The dictates of Barry v. Barchi, supra, and Aurora v. State, Department of Professional Regulation, supra have not been complied with.
The emergency order of restriction of license is quashed.
THE COURT WILL NOT ENTERTAIN A MOTION FOR REHEARING.
. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Section 120.68(1), Florida Statutes (1979).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Grantham v. Gunter, 498 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…sion hearings. Such an argument seems more appropriate to the second, equal protection issue than to the due process issue. Nevertheless, the Department points out that in Ampuero v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners, 410 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), the appellate court observed the state had a duty to grant the physician, and conclude without appreciable delay, a post-suspension hearing. This suggests no pre-suspension hearing was required. Appellant errs when he states lawy…
Authorities Cited
- Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (U.S. 1979)
- Aurora Enters., Inc. v. State, 395 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)