WILLIE MAE SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
ERROL J. POTTER, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A Florida appellate court reversed a trial court's dismissal of a complaint seeking to cancel a deed, holding that the complaint adequately alleged facts supporting an equitable mortgage claim under Florida law.
The complaint states a sufficient cause of action and should not have been dismissed. Under the allegations, the deed could be deemed an equitable mortgage under Florida law, and equity courts have jurisdiction to declare an instrument in the form of an unqualified conveyance to be, in equity, a mortgage merely securing a debt.
[1] A deed absolute on its face may be deemed a mortgage when it is executed as security for a debt.
[2] Equity has jurisdiction to declare an instrument in the form of an unqualified conveyance to be, in equity, a mortgage securing a debt and to recognize the grantor's equi…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under these allegations of the complaint, the deed could be deemed a mortgage under section 697.01(1), Florida Statutes (1979).”
Establishes that the complaint's allegations are sufficient to support an equitable mortgage theory under Florida law.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Smith owned a home subject to two mortgages that faced foreclosure. Appellee Potter contacted Smith and offered to help save the property fr…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Equitable Mortgage cases and more on FLexlaw
COWART, Judge.
Appellant filed a complaint in equity alleging that she had executed. a deed to appellee without adequate consideration and without intent to transfer an indefeasible legal title and praying that the deed be cancelled. The defendant filed an answer and counterclaim and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint apparently on the basis that it did not state a cause of action. The complaint is poorly drawn; however, a liberal reading of it indicates that at one time appellant owned a home subject to two mortgages, that the two mortgages had been foreclosed and the foreclosure sale date set when appellee contacted appellant and “offered to help her save her property from the foreclosure sale” pursuant to which, to avert the foreclosure sale, appellee paid all sums due the two mortgagees and appellant executed to appellee the deed in question.
Under these allegations of the complaint, the deed could be deemed a mortgage under section 697.01(1), Florida Statutes (1979). Equity peculiarly has jurisdiction to declare an instrument in the form of a unqualified conveyance to be, in equity, a mortgage merely securing a debt and to recognize the equity of redemption that remains in the grantor of such a deed. Since under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110(b) every complaint is considered to pray for general relief, it cannot be said that the complaint lacked such equity (or failed to state a cause of action) as to be subject to dismissal. Accordingly the judgment on the pleadings is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
COBB and SHARP, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Oregrund Ltd. P'ship v. Sheive, 873 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…11 and civil theft.12 We find nothing in the record to justify the dismissal of Count VII, which alternately pleaded for a declaration of the deed to be a mortgage, section 697.01, Blanco v. Novoa, 854 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), Smith v. Potter, 406 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); or for cancellation of the deed, Leonard v. Howarth, 153 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s orders and remand for further action consistent with this opinion. REVERSED and REMANDED. SAWAYA…