STAVROS SAMUEL SINTROS AND LURLINE SINTROS, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
ROBERT C. LAVALLE, ET AL., APPELLEES; AVIS RENT-A-CAR SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL., APPELLANTS, V. SERGEANT LAWRENCE KERLY, ET AL., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Plaintiffs injured in a car accident caused by a rental vehicle driver being chased by police sought damages from Volusia County for negligent pursuit. The trial court dismissed the complaint against the county based on sovereign immunity, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the operation of a motor vehicle by a governmental employee is an operational activity subject to tort liability regardless of whether the decision to pursue was discretionary.
The court held that the operation of a motor vehicle by a governmental employee within the scope of governmental employment is an operational activity, not a discretionary function, and therefore a governmental agency can be held liable for negligence in the operation of that vehicle regardless of whether the decision to pursue was discretionary in nature.
[1] The operation of a motor vehicle by a governmental employee within the scope of employment is an operational level activity, not subject to sovereign immunity.
[2] A complaint alleging negligent operation of a government vehicle causing injury states a cause of action against a governmental agency, even if the reason for the activit…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Without sophistry we hold that, without regard to the 'planning or discretionary' level of the reason for the activity, the operation of a motor vehicle by a governmental employee within the scope of his governmental employment is an 'operational level' activity”
The core holding establishing that vehicle operation by governmental employees constitutes an operational activity subject to tort liability
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStavros Sintros was injured when struck by a vehicle owned by Avis Rent-A-Car and operated by Robert LaValle. LaValle was being chased by a traffic co…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Third Party Complaint cases and more on FLexlaw
COWART, Judge.
Appellant, Stavros Sin tros, was injured when the vehicle he occupied was struck in an accident caused by a vehicle owned by appellant Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., and operated by appellee LaValle. At the time of the accident, LaValle was being chased by a traffic control police officer of the sheriff’s department of the appellee Volusia County. Appellants’1 second amended complaint against LaValle, Avis and Volusia County and Avis’ third party complaint against Volusia County both allege that Volusia County’s police officers were negligent in many enumerated aspects in and while pursuing LaValle under the circumstances and that such negligence contributed to, or caused, appellants’ injuries. The trial court dismissed both complaints as to Volusia County without specifying reasons. Since a cause of action against governmental agencies for the negligence of police officers under the circumstances well pleaded in both complaints has been recognized2 in Florida, and because of arguments made in support of the motions to dismiss and to strike the complaints, appellants assumed that the complaint was dismissed because the trial court held as a matter of law that the decision to pursue, and the manner in which it was done, were “planning or discretionary level” matters rather than “operational level” functions; the result being Volusia County had sovereign immunity from tort liability under Commercial Carrier Corporation v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.1979), notwithstanding section 768.28(1), Florida Statutes (1979). We likewise assume that was the basis for the dismissals and reverse.
Without sophistry we hold that, without regard to the “planning or discretionary” level of the reason for the activity, the operation of a motor vehicle by a governmental employee within the scope of his governmental employment is an “operational level” activity and that a complaint properly alleging that such activity was negligently performed and that such negligence was the legal cause of plaintiff’s injuries states a cause of action for compensatory damages against a governmental agency as against the argument of sovereign immunity-The order dismissing the second amended complaint and Avis’ third party complaint is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH and SHARP, JJ., concur. . Mr. Sintros was joined by his wife, who as-serfs a claim for loss of consortium.
. City of Miami v. Horne, 198 So. 2d 10 (Fla.1967); Reed v. City of Winter Park, 253 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971); Evanoff v. City of St. Petersburg, 186 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); Town of Mt. Dora v. Bryant, 128 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Putnam v. Eaton Constr. Co., 535 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)…ke a police officer, Reteneller had no duty to engage in a chase of Davis. However, even if he was attempting to make a common-law citizen’s arrest,2 he did not have the right to press the chase in a negligent or reckless manner. Sintros v. Lavalle, 406 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).3 Factors which were established here, which a jury could consider in determining liability, are the speed of the chase, the type of streets it covered, the density of traffic, and threats or other circumstances which put the pur…
-
Brown v. City OF Pinellas Park, 557 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…i.e., in which there are, as we have indicated, allegations to the effect that, borrowing from the words of Horne, the pursuit “exceeded] proper and rational bounds” and was continued “in a negligent, careless or wanton manner.” Sintros v. LaValle, 406 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), while factually sketchy, is similar to this case. Sintros cites Horne and fully supports our reversal. In Sint-ros, the plaintiff alleged that he was injured when his vehicle was struck by a vehicle that was being pursued by pol…
-
Palmer v. City OF Daytona Beach, 443 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)…Corporation v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.1979); § 768.28, Fla.Stat. (1981). We have held that the negligent carrying out of city governmental powers and functions at that level may result in [*372] tort liability. Sintros v. LaValle, 406 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Jones v. City of Longwood, 404 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), review denied, 412 So. 2d 467 (Fla.1982). We cannot distinguish this case from the others on the ground that the city employees here were engaged in discretionary a…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cnty., 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979)
- City OF Miami v. Elzie C. Horne, Sr., 198 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1967)
- Town OF Mount Dora v. Bryant, 128 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
- Evanoff v. City OF ST. Petersburg, 186 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- Reed v. City OF Winter Park, 253 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)