EMIL PFISTER AND GRACE PFISTER, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
PARKWAY GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC., APPELLEE
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Emil Pfister was injured by a falling floor-buffing machine while recovering from surgery at Parkway General Hospital. The trial court directed a verdict finding the hospital negligent, but the jury found for the hospital on the issue of proximate causation. The appellate court affirmed, holding that proximate causation was properly left to the jury and that without a special interrogatory verdict, it was impossible to determine whether the jury based its verdict on lack of causation or on collateral source payments.
The jury verdict was proper because proximate causation is a fact question for the jury unless the issue is so clear that reasonable people cannot differ. The appellate court could not determine whether the jury based its verdict on lack of proximate causation or improper consideration of collateral source payments, and without a special interrogatory verdict and a timely objection, reversal would be improper.
[1] Whether negligence was a legal cause of injury is a question for the jury unless reasonable minds cannot differ.
[2] A jury verdict in favor of a defendant is permissible even when liability is established as a matter of law, if the jury finds the defendant's negligence was not the prox…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Questions of proximate cause are generally decided by a jury unless the issue is so clear that reasonable men cannot differ.”
Establishes that proximate causation is primarily a jury question, supporting the trial court's submission of this issue to the jury despite the directed verdict on negligence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEmil Pfister underwent surgery at Parkway General Hospital. Two weeks post-surgery, while chatting with another patient's wife, a floor-buffing machin…
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BASKIN, Judge.
Appellant Emil Pfister underwent surgery at Parkway General Hospital. Two weeks later, as he chatted with the wife of the patient in the next bed, a floor-buffing machine broke apart and crashed into his bed. During the trial of his action against the hospital, the court instructed the jury that as a matter of law, the hospital was negligent.
The jury then deliberated concerning whether that negligence was a legal cause of the loss, injury, or damage sustained by Emil Pfister. The court instructed, “If the greater weight of the evidence does not support the claim of the Plaintiffs, then such negligence was not a legal cause of loss, injury or damage.” The jury returned a verdict in favor of Parkway General Hospital, Inc.
Appellant seeks reversal on two grounds: first, he contends the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Next, he argues that the court’s refusal to charge the jury not to reduce compensatory damages by amounts he received from collateral sources was error.
We affirm.
First, appellant contends that in light of the directed verdict establishing liability and the uncontroverted evidence of injury to him, the verdict in favor of appel-lee was improper.
We disagree. Although the question concerning the hospital’s negligence was determined as a matter of law, whether that negligence caused injury was a fact to be decided by the jury. Questions of proximate cause are generally decided by a jury unless the issue is so clear that reasonable men cannot differ. Helman v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 349 So. 2d 1187 (Fla.1977); Brightwell v. Beem, 90 So. 2d 320 (Fla.1956).
The evidence presented by appellant was controverted by appellee. A review of the record reveals that a jury of reasonable people could have returned a verdict for appellee. See Midstate Hauling Company v. Fowler, 176 So. 2d 87 (Fla.1965); Biltmore Terrace Association v. Kegan, 130 So. 2d 631 (Fla.3d DCA 1961).
Next, we consider appellant’s contention that the court should have cautioned the jury against reductions for collateral source payments. The court instructed on negligence, legal cause, and damage.
The jury found either that the hospital’s negligence caused no injury or damage or that the negligence was the proximate cause of damage but that appellant’s receipt of payments from a collateral source negated further payment. The latter finding would have been improper, but because a special interrogatory verdict was not used, it is impossible for us to determine which ground the jury relied upon in reaching its verdict. In the absence of an objection to the use of the general verdict, the “two issue” rule dictates that reversal would be improper because appellant is unable to demonstrate prejudice. Whitman v. Castlewood International Corp., 383 So. 2d 618 (Fla.1980); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarbrough, 355 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.1978).
Although we agree that the court’s failure to instruct against reducing damages for collateral source payments could require reversal, where, as here, the verdict may have been based on either of two grounds, we must affirm.
In light of the court’s instruction to the jury that if it found for Parkway General Hospital it should not consider the question of damages, and without a special interrogatory verdict to enable us to determine upon which of the two theories the jury based its verdict, we find no error. Affirmed.
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Brown v. M. David Sims, M.D., 538 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…evidence a judgment is sustainable under the two-issue rule only if the issue which the appellee relies upon as an alternative ground for affirmance is not also affected by the prejudicial evidentiary ruling. See Pfister v. Parkway Gen. Hosp., Inc., 405 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (general verdict on negligence claim covered all elements of negligence on which jury was charged, but two-issue rule applied as to collateral source payment issue, supported by separate evidence, which could have been the basis f…
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Gonzalez v. Leon, 511 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…cases involving multiple elements of a cause of action. We find nothing in Colonial Stores or Whitman to suggest such a limitation and no logical reason to create one. Indeed, we recognized no such limitation in Pfister v. Parkway General Hospital, 405 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), where we found harmless the trial court’s error in refusing to instruct the jury not to reduce damages by amounts received by the plaintiff from collateral sources — an instruction relating to damages only — because the general v…
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Getelman v. Burton R. Levey, 481 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…rsed where the complaining party did not request a separate finding. Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarbrough, 355 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.1978); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Leslie, 410 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Pfister v. Parkway General Hospital, Inc., 405 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), pet. for rev. denied, 413 So. 2d 876 (Fla.1982). Second, Mr. Getelman argues that it was error for the trial court to refuse to grant a mistrial on the ground of improper comments of counsel for Mr. Levey. In fact, only one of t…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Helman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. & William A. Cagle, 349 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1977)
- Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Doyle Wayne Scarbrough, 355 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1977)
- Whitman v. Castlewood Int'l Corp., 383 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1980)
- Brightwell v. Melville J. Beem and Glea Beem, 90 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1956)
- Midstate Hauling Co. v. Fowler, 176 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1965)
- Eskind v. City OF Vero Beach, 130 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)