GRADY PEADEN
v.
R. J. ESTES AND WIFE, CATHERINE ESTES AND T. J. ESTES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decree denying the former owner's right to recover land from a tax deed holder. The court held that the tax deed holder's actual possession, occupancy, and use of the property for over four years entitled it to the protections of Section 196.06, Fla. Stat., which bars recovery actions after that period has elapsed.
The court held that the tax deed holder was entitled to the protection of Section 196.06 because the evidence demonstrated actual possession, occupancy, and use of the property for more than four years. The character of possession in this case—including turpentine operations, timber growth management, and continuous control and supervision—was substantially stronger than the minimal possession shown in the cited precedent case.
“When the holder of a tax deed goes into actual possession, occupancy and use of the land embraced in such tax deed, and so continues for a period of four years, no suit for the recovery of the possession thereof shall be brought by a former owner or other adverse claimant, unless such suit be commenced within, or prior to, the said period of four years after the holder under such tax deed has entered into the actual possession, occupancy and use of the land embraced in said tax deed”
Statutory provision at issue, establishing the four-year bar to recovery actions for tax deed holders in actual possession.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendants, R. J. Estes and J. T. Estes, held a tax deed and entered into actual possession, occupancy, and use of the land beginning in January 1…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
We affirmed the decree here on appeal without opinion and have since granted a rehearing.
The controlling question is whether the holder of a tax deed in this case is entitled to the benefit of Section 196.06, Fla. Stat., 1941, F.S.A., which provides:
“When the holder of a tax deed goes into actual possession, occupancy and use of the land embraced in such tax deed, and so continues for a period of four years, no suit for the recovery of the possession thereof shall be brought by a former owner or other adverse claimant, unless such suit be commenced within, or prior to, the said period of four years after the holder under such tax deed has entered into the actual possession, occupancy and use of the land embraced in said tax deed;
The chancellor found:
“The defendants, R. J. Estes and J. T. Estes and then-predecessors in title, have enjoyed the actual possession, occupancy and use of the lands, in question, beginning in January, 1937, and continuing until about September, 1942, at which time turpentine operations on said property ceased due to the fact that Lamar Estes, who is a brother of the defendants and was by them employed to carry on such turpentine operations, was called into the Armed Forces of this nation. The court further finds from the evidence that from September, 1942, until the institution of litigation, the defendants used the property for the growth of pine timber and kept the same under their control and supervision. The defendants, through their agent and servant, J. E. Estes, were *870in possession of the property, and were engaged in cutting and removing pulp wood therefrom when such possession was terminated on February 1, 1947, by a restraining order issued by the Commissioner of this Court at the suit of Grady Peaden, which order was in force at the time of the filing of the above entitled cause.”
Appellant insists that Sanvorn v. South Florida Naval Stores Company, 75 Fla. 145, 78 So. 428, compels a reversal of this decree. In the cited case the showing of possession was only that of paying taxes and taking turpentine from the trees. From the quoted findings of the chancellor the character of possession in this case is much stronger.
We, therefore, adhere to our former judgment of affirmance.
So ordered.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL and BARNS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Palmquist v. Johnson, 41 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1949)…as proper. In affirming the judgment here for the appellee, Martin, it was not necessary to consider or rule upon the provisions of Section 196.06, and such comment thereon was a gratuity and must be treated as surplusage. See Peaden v. Estes, Fla., 36 So. 2d 923. Chapter 21822, Acts of 1943, Laws of Florida, Sections 66.26 and 66.27, F.S.A., authorizes grantees under tax deeds which have been acquired by the State, or any political division thereof, through any tax proceeding to maintain suits to quiet tit…
Authorities Cited
- Sanborn v. S. Fla. Naval Stores Co., 75 Fla. 145 (Fla. 1918)