THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
VIRCHUS DANE TILLMAN, APPELLEE
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The State appeals a suppression order in a burglary and grand theft case. The trial court properly suppressed fingerprint standards obtained during an illegal stop, but the appellate court reverses the suppression of pre-existing latent fingerprints and standards obtained independently of the illegality, holding that the defendant lacks standing to suppress evidence taken from the crime scene.
The trial court properly suppressed fingerprint standards obtained during the illegal stop, but the suppression order was overly broad to the extent it suppressed the defendant, pre-existing latent fingerprints or standards obtained independently of the illegality, and latent fingerprints obtained from the crime scene. The defendant lacks standing to suppress latent fingerprints taken from the victim's property.
[1] An illegal arrest, without more, does not bar subsequent prosecution or serve as a defense to a valid charge.
[2] A defendant's person is not suppressible as fruit of the poisonous tree, and the illegality of an initial stop and detention does not prevent the state from proving guilt…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An illegal arrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution nor as a defense to a valid charge.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that an illegal stop does not prevent prosecution or shield the defendant from criminal liability
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficers illegally stopped and detained defendant Tillman. During this illegal detention, they obtained fingerprint standards from him on a field stri…
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PER CURIAM.
The State appeals an order of suppression. The State concedes that the findings in the trial court’s order concerning the illegality of the initial stop of the defendant are correct, and that the trial court acted properly in suppressing the fingerprint evidence actually seized during the course of the stop and detention. The trial court’s order also suppressed the defendant himself and does not specify whether its suppression of “fingerprints” and “fingerprint standards” applies to latent or standard fingerprints, which were obtained prior to the defendant’s illegal stop and detention, or to new standards which may be sought by the State pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.220(b)(l)(iii).
An illegal arrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution nor as a defense to a valid charge. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1836). The defendant himself is not considered as suppressible fruit and the illegality of his initial stop and detention by the Public Safety Department officers and detectives does not deprive the State of an opportunity to prove his guilt through evidence which is not tainted by police misconduct. See: United States v. Crews, supra.
The fingerprint standards, which were taken from the defendant on the field strip during the course of his illegal stop and detention, were properly suppressed. However, so much of the order which suppresses the defendant’s “fingerprints” and “fingerprint standards” is too broad and should not include pre-existing latent fingerprints or fingerprint standards which are obtained independent of the illegal stop, whether they are currently in existence or will be taken in the future.
The order also should not suppress the latent fingerprints which were taken from the scene of the burglary and grand theft in the instant cause. The defendant does not have standing to suppress the latent prints which were taken from the victim’s property. The defendant has not shown that he had any reasonable expectation of privacy or interest of possession or ownership in the premises from where the latent fingerprints were lifted. See: Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 386 (1978); United States v. Sal-vucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619, (1980); Mixon v. State, 51 So. 2d 190 (Fla.1957); Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 68 (Fla.1971). The police had lawfully obtained the latent prints from the crime scene prior to the defendant’s illegal stop and detention. The latents in the instant case were, in fact, matched to already existing fingerprint standards of the defendant. Since the illegally obtained fingerprints taken on the field strip were not the only link between the defendant and the burglary and grand theft in the instant cause, it is clear that routine investigatory procedure would have led to the inevitable link between the defendant and the instant crimes. See: United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1978).
The exclusionary rule enjoins the government (or State) from benefiting from evidence it has unlawfully obtained; it does not reach backward to taint information that was in official hands prior to any illegality. United States v. Crews, supra. Also see: State v. Traas, 343 So. 2d 1294 (Fla.2d DCA 1977); State v. Jackson, 240 So. 2d 48 (Fla.3d DCA 1970).
Therefore, so much of the order under review that suppresses more than the fingerprints taken on the “field strip” is reversed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
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State v. E.T., 560 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…he defendant based on no probable cause,” State v. Spencer, 443 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), because “[a]n illegal arrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution nor as defense to a valid charge,” State v. Tillman, 402 So. 2d 19, 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); accord State v. Brooks, 388 So. 2d 1291, 1292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); State v. Umbrecht, 371 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); and that “the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he ha[s] been…1 / 2
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Clausell v. State, 548 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…the undeniable proposition that even a constitutionally improper search [*891] does not “revert back” so as to taint the product of an earlier, properly undertaken police action. State v. Eicher, 431 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); State v. Tillman, 402 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Thus, the second search and seizure had nothing to do with the admitted propriety of the first consent search in which the police saw and carefully examined the jacket, and most important of all, noted its location in the defenda…
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Perry v. State, 478 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…Ed.2d 537 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 95 S.Ct. 854, 865, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed.2d 541 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886); State v. Tillman, 402 So. 2d 19 (Fla.3d DCA 1981). Neither should an indictment or information be dismissed by a trial court on the ground that the police unlawfully arrested a defendant based on no probable cause. See State v. Spencer, 443 So. 2d 1086 (Fla.3d DCA 1984). The conf…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (U.S. 1978)
- Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (U.S. 1969)
- United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (U.S. 1974)
- Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (U.S. 1975)
- United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1980)
- Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (U.S. 1952)
- KER v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1886)
- United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (U.S. 1980)
- Newhall v. Le Breton, 119 U.S. 259 (U.S. 1886)
- Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1971)