VERNELL KING, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Vernell King was charged with failure to appear after being released on his own recognizance. King challenged the charge, arguing that Section 843.15 only applied to defendants released on bail, not on their own recognizance. The court held that defendants released on own recognizance can be prosecuted for failure to appear because a recognizance carries an implicit promise to appear.
A defendant released on his own recognizance can be charged with failure to appear under Section 843.15 because a recognizance carries with it an implicit promise to appear, and prosecution is not limited only to those released on surety or cash bond.
[1] A defendant released on their own recognizance may be prosecuted for failure to appear before the court.
[2] Failure to appear after being released on one's own recognizance violates statutes prohibiting failure to appear, even if those statutes also mention bail.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the judge was empowered by Section 903.03(2)(a) to release a person charged with a crime on his own recognizance, and the fact that the defendant failed to keep his word that he would appear as ordered does not allow him to also escape a prosecution simply because he did not have either a cash bond or a surety company”
Establishes the court's core holding that own recognizance releases do not exempt defendants from failure to appear prosecution
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKing was charged with grand theft on July 1, 1980, and held in jail until July 28, 1980, when he was released on his own recognizance. King failed to …
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LILES, W00DIE A., Associate Judge (Retired).
Vernell King was charged with the crime of grand theft on July 1, 1980. He remained in jail awaiting trial until July 28, 1980, when he was released on his own recognizance pursuant to Section 903.03(1), Florida Statutes (1979). When King failed to appear for pretrial conference on August 5,1980, the release on his own recognizance was revoked and a capias with a bond was issued. King was apprehended in November, 1980. He was charged with failure to appear before the court, in violation of Section 843.15, Florida Statutes (1979).
A motion was filed on his behalf to dismiss the charge of failure to appear for the reason that since King was released on his own recognizance, he could not be charged with a violation of Section 843.15, since that section dealt only with defendants released on bail as opposed to released on their own recognizance. The trial judge denied the motion to dismiss. Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss, and received a sentence of two years imprisonment.
Appellant now urges that we reverse the trial judge, since the harshest penalty he could receive would be a conviction of indirect criminal contempt. He bases that argument on the language contained in Section 843.15(2), which provides:
Nothing in this Section shall interfere with or prevent the exercise by any court of its power to punish for contempt.
We believe the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss for the reason that the judge was empowered by Section 903.03(2)(a) to release a person charged with a crime on his own recognizance, and the fact that the defendant failed to keep his word that he would appear as ordered does not allow him to also escape a prosecution simply because he did not have either a cash bond or a surety company.
It is true that Chapter 843, Florida Statutes, speaks in terms of forfeiture of security as does Chapter 903. This does not, however, exclude punishment for defendants who are released on their own recognizance when the very term recognizance carries with it a promise as opposed to a surety. To rule otherwise would have a chilling effect upon trial judges releasing those charged with a crime without surety and would render Section 903.03(2)(a) a nullity.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
McCORD and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
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In re Standard Jury Instructions IN Crim. Cases-Report NO. 2012-05, 131 So. 3d 755 (Fla. 2013)…court dates is outside the protection of the attorney-client privilege. Watkins v. State, 516 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). A defendant may be convicted of Failure to Appear if he or she was released on his or her own recognizance. King v. State, 401 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). A defendant who leaves during his or her trial may be convicted of Failure to Appear. Howard v. State, 457 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). This instruction was adopted in 2013. . The Committee’s report originally asked the Cou…
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Jordan v. State of Fla. & Dep't of Corr. (Fla. 5th DCA 2021)…ted by the rule is unconditional, or without exception. Indeed, such an interpretation would be contrary to the term “recognizance” itself. “Recognizance” is not unconditional—it carries with it 5 a promise as opposed to a surety. See King v. State, 401 So. 2d 931, 932 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); see also Recognizance, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“A bond or obligation, made in court, by which a person promises to perform some act or observe some condition, such as to appear when called, to pay a debt, or…