JESS V. COHN
v.
WILLIS COHN
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed an award of a special master's fee in an uncontested divorce case, holding that the chancellor failed to apply the correct legal standard under the applicable statute for determining master compensation.
The master's fee award was improper because the chancellor failed to apply the correct statutory standard. In ordinary cases involving no peculiar difficulty or extraordinary labor, a master should receive only the compensation fixed by statute or court rule, not additional compensation based on factors like the defendant's wealth, the master's experience, or the importance of the case.
“In all ordinary cases of no peculiar or special difficulty, and involving no extraordinary labor, the master should be allowed no greater compensation than that fixed by the statute or rule of court.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for master compensation in straightforward cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA special master presided over a divorce case involving a defendant who was a prominent physician with substantial income. The master conducted multip…
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This appeal questions the granting of a $1000.00 master’s fee in an uncontested divorce action. On rehearing the chancellor reduced the fee to $750.00. The award was made upon the master’s report that:
“The Master has received no fees for his services in this matter but would show to the Court that there have been five or six hearings and many, many conferences with both the attorneys for the parties and the parties themselves, both in the presence of the counsel and at times when no counsel was present and innumerable telephone conversations. The Master is of the opinion that all the parties and their attorneys would agree that the patient and sympathetic handling of this cause by the Master has brought about a settlement between the parties which could not have been done if it had been handled otherwise. Therefore the Master suggests to the Honorable Court that he be paid a fee of not less than $1,000.00.”
On final hearing the divorce was granted without contest and property settlement, previously agreed upon, was approved by the court and the $1000.00 fee was awarded the master. Upon petition for rehearing the chancellor observed:
"... The Court takes into consideration the following:
“1. The importance of this case.
*621“2. The age of the Special Master.
“3. The ability of the Special Master.
“4. The experience of the Special Master.
“5. The wide knowledge of law of the Special Master.
“6. The responsibility assumed herein by the Special Master.
“7. The quality of the work done by the Special Master herein.
“8. The testimony taken on the said petition for rehearing.
“9. The purchase power of money.
“10. The financial ability of the defendant.
“11. The income of the defendant.
“12. The fact that the defendant has not testified that the allowance herein made for the Special Master will work any financial hardship upon him.
“13. The fact that the defendant is a leading physician and surgeon in his specialty in this community and thereby enjoys a large income therefrom.
“14. The fact that at final hearing of this cause, George W. Wood, attorney for plaintiff, and Lawrence E. Hoffman, attorney for defendant, both stated to the Court that the said allowance as Special Master’s fee in the final decree was reasonable.
“At the hearing before the undersigned on said petition for rehearing the Special Master in Chancery stated he would be satisfied with a fee of $750.00. ...”
Thereupon the fee was reduced to $750.00 which is now asserted to be excessive.
The chancellor failed to apply the right principle of law. The statute, Sec. 62.07, Fla. Stat., 1941, F.S.A., prescribes a standard relative to master’s compensation. From the above quotation it is apparent that the chancellor failed to be guided by the statute.
It is well stated by Kooman, Florida Chancery Pleading and Practice, page 306:
“ . . . Where masters are to hear witnesses, examine a,nd consider evidence, try and determine controverted questions of fact, investigate and state complicated and controverted accounts, and make reports of the proceedings and results to *622the court, it has generally been understood and practiced that they should be allowed a reasonable compensation irrespective of schedules of fees. In such cases the court will allow compensation commensurate with the master’s ability, experience, and fitness for the tasks assigned to him and commensurate with the importance and difficulty of his work and the responsibility it imposes upon him. But the tendency of the court should be to keep down these charges instead of adding to the burdensome expense of litigation. In all ordinary cases of no peculiar or special difficulty, and involving no extraordinary labor, the master should be allowed no greater compensation than that fixed by the statute or rule of court. ...”
The author has made a fair summation of our holdings in Mabry, et al., v. Knabb, 151 Fla. 432, 10 So. (2nd) 330; Marion Mts. Co. v. Moorman, et al., 100 Fla. 1522, 131 So. 650.
There is no basis in this case to warrant compensation in addition to that fixed by the statute and the decree is reversed for another decree according to law.
Reversed.
THOMAS, C. J., BARNS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Provus v. Provus, 44 So.2d 656 (Fla. 1950)…wife, but, on the other hand, it is the usual mill run case for which the Special Master's compensation should be calculated under the provisions of Section 62.07, F.S.A. See Marion Mortgage Co. v. Moorman, 100 Fla. 1522, 131 So. 650; Cohn v. Cohn, 160 Fla. 619, 36 So. 2d 199; Rainey v. Rainey, Fla, 38 So. 2d 60; Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v. Clark, Fla., 42 So. 2d 279. Fixing the amount of counsel fees, as a general rule always presents a delicate question. Under our adjudications some of the elements…
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Donner v. Margo Donner, 346 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)…es in Florida indicates that in Marion Mortgage Company v. Moorman, 100 Fla. 1522, 131 So. 650 (1930), an extraordinary fee for a master in the amount of $2,500.00 was disallowed and the master was limited to the then statutory fee; in Cohn v. Cohn, 160 Fla. 619, 36 So. 2d 199 (1948), a $750.00 master’s fee was also reversed, and the master was accorded nothing but the statutory fee; in Garlick v. Garlick, 38 So. 2d 222 (Fla.1948), without error being assigned, the Supreme Court of Florida found a master’s…
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H.L. Clark III v. Finger, 763 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…sation, where the work the master performed demanded greater skill. See Provus v. Provus, 44 So. 2d 656, 657 (Fla.1950); Gulf-stream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Clark, 42 So. 2d 279 (Fla.1949); Rainey v. Rainey, 38 So. 2d 60 (Fla.1948); Cohn v. Cohn, 160 Fla. 619, 36 So. 2d 199 (1948). At present, section 69.051 gives the trial court discretion to award such fees.1 Donner v. Donner, 346 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Thus, we must review this award on an abuse of discretion standard.2 Donner. We agree with…
Authorities Cited
- Mabry v. Knabb, 151 Fla. 432 (Fla. 1942)
- Marion Mortg. Co. v. Moorman, 100 Fla. 1522 (Fla. 1930)