STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, PETITIONERS,
v.
HONORABLE JEANNE DAWES CRENSHAW, ACTING CIRCUIT JUDGE OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, ALACHUA COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Florida's Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services challenged a circuit court order establishing additional juvenile detention criteria beyond those enumerated in Florida Statute 39.032(2). The appellate court granted the petition for writ of certiorari and vacated the order, holding that the trial judge exceeded her authority by creating detention standards not authorized by statute.
The court held that the circuit judge exceeded her authority by establishing additional detention criteria. The statutory criteria are narrow in scope and do not authorize the creation of supplemental detention standards through judicial order, despite the statute's "otherwise order" language.
[1] A court order establishing additional criteria for juvenile detention beyond those enumerated in Florida Statute 39.032(2) is vacated.
[2] Florida Statute 39.032(2) enumerates narrow criteria for the secure detention of children prior to disposition.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“These criteria are narrow in scope and do not consider other situations which may endanger the child or jeopardize the community if the child is not initially detained.”
Establishes that the statutory criteria are limited and do not authorize judicial expansion of detention grounds
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJudge Crenshaw issued an "Order Establishing Additional Juvenile Detention Criteria" that expanded the circumstances under which juveniles could be de…
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PER CURIAM.
The petition for writ of certiorari seeking to set aside Judge Crenshaw’s “Order Establishing Additional Juvenile Detention Criteria”1 is granted. See State ex rel. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Upchurch, 394 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Schwarz v. Nourse, 390 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Accordingly, the order below is vacated.
ORDER VACATED.
SHAW, WENTWORTH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . The order, exclusive of its formal parts, is set forth here in full:
Florida Statute 39.032(2), 1980, enumerates the criteria for secure detention of children prior to the court’s disposition. These criteria are narrow in scope and do not consider other situations which may endanger the child or jeopardize the community if the child is not initially detained.
Pursuant to those further provisions of this statute which authorize the court to “otherwise " order detention in a secure facility, it is
ADJUDGED:
1. The intake officer responsible for detention screening shall detain in a secure facility any child who:
(a) is an escapee from a commitment program in Florida,
(b) is currently under a Florida probation or Community Control order and is newly charged with a felony,
(c) is a runaway from another state and is charged with a crime,
(d) has been ordered into custody by a Florida court,
(e) is charged with the sale of or manufacture of, or trafficking in a controlled substance,
(f) is charged with criminal mischief and the damage is more than $1,000.00,
(g) who is, by virtue of involvement in drugs or alcohol, or any uncontrollable mental disability, unable to control his or her own conduct, as evidenced by such activities as to place the said child in clear and present danger, or to cause an immediate danger to the community unless the child is temporarily detained,
(h) is a child charged with a crime of violence to another where there is suspicion that should the child not be detained he is likely to injure the same victim or others.
2. Children detained under this order will be presented for a detention hearing within the time prescribed by law.
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Garvin v. State, 413 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…the designation provided by each specific criminal offense statute, not by the term of imprisonment. Section 775.081(1), Fla.Stat. (1979). Section 775.082(3)(b) expressly recognizes that a first degree felony may be punishable by life. Lee v. State, 399 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Nor can the firearm enhancement statute, Section 775.087(1)(a), be applied to increase this offense to a life felony. Richardson v. State, 398 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). It follows from this Court’s decision in Abram v. S…
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McLEOD v. State, 523 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…ry, committed while the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, as a “life felony,” but rather as a “felony of the first degree punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.” (e.s.) See also Lee v. State, 399 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA), pet. for rev. denied, 407 So. 2d 1106 (Fla.1981) (armed robbery is not a “life felony”, but is a “felony of the first degree”). Second, even if the lower court had correctly concluded that armed robbery is a life felony, for which th…
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Hogan v. State, 401 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)…tatutes (1979). We agree and reverse. The trial court ruled that Hogan’s conviction for armed robbery precluded his treatment as a youthful offender. At the time of his order, the trial judge did not have the benefit of our ruling in Lee v. State, 399 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), in which we held that an armed robbery conviction does not preclude youthful offender treatment. Accordingly, the order is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with Lee v. State, supra. BOOTH…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State of Fla. ex rel. Dep't OF Health & Rehabilitative Servs. & D. Jarrard v. Honorable John J. Upchurch, 394 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Elton H. Schwarz v. Nourse, 390 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)