WILLIAM J. COLE AND TERI COLE, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS/CROSS APPELLEES,
v.
MICHAEL JAMES GLYNN AND EILEEN GLYNN, HIS WIFE, AND PAUL D. JAGERS, JR., AND MARY ELLEN JAGERS, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES/CROSS APPELLANTS
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm the action of the trial judge in permitting the intervention of the Jagers, appellees, and in vacating the default judgment. We believe the trial court was entitled to conclude that the Jagers had demonstrated sufficient equities or other special reasons to justify their participation in the proceedings. See Intermediary Finance Corp. v. McKay, 93 Fla. 101, 111 So. 531 (Fla.1927); Doyle v. Tutan, 110 So. 2d 42 (Fla.3d DCA 1959).
We also find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in leaving the appellants in temporary possession of the property in question. This affirmance should not be construed as any indication by this court concerning the merits of the issues which now remain for the trial court to resolve.
ANSTEAD, J., and LEONARD RIVKIND, Associate Judge, concur. MOORE, J., dissents without opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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O'Connell v. Rabin, 596 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…ntervene in litigation involving the corporation. We reverse. Where a party, as here, has demonstrated sufficient equities or other special reasons to justify their participation in the proceedings, intervention should be permitted. Cole v. Glynn, 397 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); see also Wags Transportation System v. City of Miami Beach, 88 So. 2d 751 (Fla.1956). The facts of this case, at this posture, dictate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s intervention. Concomitant…
Authorities Cited
- Intermediary Fin. Corp. v. McKay, 93 Fla. 101 (Fla. 1927)
- Otto DI Vosta and Verna Di Vosta v. Boam Corp., 110 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)