ARMODIO RUIZ, A/K/A ROBERTO PUIG, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Armodio Ruiz was convicted by jury of carrying a concealed firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court's curative instruction failed to adequately dispel prejudicial statements made by the prosecutor in opening arguments regarding Ruiz's arrest for auto theft, which was not a charged crime.
The court's curative instruction did not assure Ruiz of a fair trial because it failed to adequately destroy the likelihood of jury prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's statement that Ruiz had been arrested for driving a vehicle reported stolen. The instruction was insufficient under settled Florida law requiring that jury instructions dispel prejudicial prosecutor statements.
[1] A curative instruction to the jury must sufficiently dispel the prejudicial effect of a prosecutor's remarks to assure a fair trial.
[2] A prosecutor's statement that a defendant was arrested for auto theft, when the defendant is only charged with firearm offenses, is likely to prejudice the jury.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is settled Florida law that a new trial may be ordered if a court's instruction to the jury fails to dispel the likelihood that statements made by a prosecutor will prejudice the jury in its duty to presume the defendant innocent and to weigh impartially the evidence.”
Establishes the legal standard for evaluating whether curative instructions are sufficient to remedy prosecutorial misconduct.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRuiz was arrested after his truck struck a parked vehicle. He initially gave a false name (Jose Rodriguez) and was found to be driving a stolen truck.…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Jury Prejudice cases and more on FLexlaw
FERGUSON, Judge.
Armodio Ruiz was charged by information with carrying a concealed firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of Sections 790.01 and 790.23, Florida Statutes (1977). Ruiz appeals a jury conviction on both counts claiming lack of fair trial.
The controlling question for review is whether a curative instruction to the jury assured Ruiz of a fair trial by sufficiently dispelling the prejudicial effect of certain remarks made by the prosecutor in his opening statement. We find that it did not.
Ruiz was arrested for not having a valid driver’s license after the truck which he had been driving struck a parked vehicle. Ruiz’s brother was a passenger in the truck. The police officer found a loaded .357 magnum under the driver’s seat and a pistol under the passenger’s seat.
In the opening argument to the jury the prosecutor stated:
“[Ruiz] was placed under arrest for two items; one was no valid driver’s license because he did not show a driver’s license to the police officer when he was asked to produce one. In fact, at this particular point, the defendant gave his name as Jose Rodriguez and subsequently, after running a vehicle check on the tag, he was placed under arrest for auto theft because the truck was reported stolen.”
Ruiz objected to the statement of arrest for auto theft and moved for mistrial pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.600(b). The court denied the motion but instructed the jury to disregard the statement:
“THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, this defendant is only on trial for the crimes charged in the Information.
As the attorneys stated and as the Court earlier stated, what the attorneys are saying now in their opening statements are not evidence and it is not to be considered by you in arriving at a verdict. Any reference to the ownership of the automobile in question is really not a matter for your consideration and it is not relevant to this case.
Can each and every one of you set aside that matter, put it out of your mind, in accordance with my instructions?
Will you all be able to do that? I see that each of you are shaking your heads in the affirmative.”
Ruiz moved for mistrial subsequent to this instruction and repeated the motion at the close of the state’s case and at the close of all evidence. The court denied each motion.
It is settled Florida law that a new trial may be ordered if a court’s instruction to the jury fails to dispel the likelihood that statements made by a prosecutor will prejudice the jury in its duty to presume the defendant innocent and to weigh impartially the evidence. Oglesby v. State, 156 Fla. 481, 23 So. 2d 558 (1945); Thorpe v. State, 350 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Groebner v. State, 342 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). See, e. g., Glassman v. State, 377 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) and cases cited therein.
In the present case, we find the court’s instruction .did not assure Ruiz of a fair trial. The court’s statement that Ruiz was on trial only for crimes in the information and the request that the jury disregard the prosecutor’s statement that Ruiz had been arrested for driving a vehicle reported stolen failed to destroy the likelihood of jury prejudice against Ruiz. Oglesby, supra.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…of all, actually overruled the objection.2 In these circumstances, we must conclude that the defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial may be upheld only by ordering a new one. Oglesby v. State, 156 Fla. 481, 23 So. 2d 558 (1945); Ruiz v. State, 395 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and cases cited; Carter v. State, supra. We choose to employ this decision to discuss the broader, very serious problem it exemplifies. For some time, this court has been faced with a veritable torrent of cases which have simila…
-
Williamson v. State, 459 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…he trial judge’s instruction that the jury simply disregard the prosecutor’s statements here was insufficient to destroy the likelihood of jury prejudice against the accused. See also State v. Coron, 411 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Ruiz v. State, 395 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 407 So. 2d 1106 (Fla.1981). Reversed and remanded for a new trial.…
-
Tacoronte v. State, 419 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…matively rebuke [*796] the offending prosecuting officer as to impress upon the jury the gross impropriety of being influenced by improper arguments." Deas v. State, 119 Fla. 839, 161 So. 729, 731 (1935) (emphasis supplied). See also Ruiz v. State, 395 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and cases cited therein. Finally, because the trial court left the prosecutor’s remarks uncured and because the evil of these remarks was to bias the jury against the defendant,. I think the harmless error doctrine is as inappli…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Will Oglesby v. State, 156 Fla. 481 (Fla. 1945)
- Bryant v. State, 377 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Glassman v. State, 377 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Thorpe v. State, 350 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Groebner v. State, 342 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)