THE RED CARPET CORPORATION OF PANAMA CITY BEACH, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND JIMMY HATCHER, APPELLANTS,
v.
CALVERT FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, A MARYLAND CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Red Carpet Corporation and Jimmy Hatcher appealed a judgment in favor of Calvert Fire Insurance Company regarding unpaid loss of earnings claims under insurance policies for two motels destroyed by Hurricane Eloise. The court reversed and remanded because the trial court erred in excluding expert testimony regarding insurance policy interpretation and industry custom.
The trial court committed reversible error in excluding the qualified expert testimony regarding the meaning of policy terms and standard industry practices for handling loss of earnings claims, as such testimony would have substantially aided the jury in resolving the factual issues central to the case.
[1] Expert testimony is admissible to assist the trier of fact in understanding issues outside the ordinary experience of the jury.
[2] Expert testimony regarding insurance policy provisions and trade custom is relevant to interpreting obscure connotations of an insurance policy.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The purpose of an expert witness is to aid the trier of fact in the quest for truth in those areas which are not of common knowledge. Obscure connotations of an insurance policy can be greatly illuminated by knowledge of custom and usage in the industry as well as the expert's knowledge of terms which take on a different hue in the specialized field than in the field of general knowledge.”
Establishes the proper role and necessity of expert testimony in insurance policy interpretation cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants owned two motels in Panama City Beach that were completely destroyed by Hurricane Eloise in 1975. The motels were insured under Calvert's s…
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RUDD, Associate Judge.
Two of appellant’s motels were completely destroyed when Hurricane Eloise hit Panama City Beach, in 1975. The motels were insured by appellee/Calvert under “special multi peril” insurance policies. The parties reached a settlement under the policies for damage and destruction to the buildings and their contents. However, appellants sued Calvert under the Loss of Earnings Endorsements contained in the policies, when Calvert declined to pay any amount beyond a $30,000 advance which it had made under these endorsements. Pursuant to a jury verdict, final judgment was entered in favor of Calvert. Appellants have presented three points for review. We find merit in appellants’ first point, and accordingly reverse.
At trial, appellants offered the testimony of an expert witness regarding insurance adjusting, policy provisions, and trade custom in the insurance industry. The witness was highly qualified as an expert in the field of insurance. However, his testimony was excluded by the trial court on the ground that it invaded the province of the jury.
It has long been recognized that the testimony of qualified experts is helpful, if not necessary, in cases presenting questions of fact not within the ordinary experience of the jury. For example, in Aetna Insurance Company v. Loxahatchee Marina, Inc., 286 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970), a case also involving the testimony of an insurance expert, the Fourth District Court of Appeal noted:
The purpose of an expert witness is to aid the trier of fact in the quest for truth in those areas which are not of common knowledge. Obscure connotations of an insurance policy can be greatly illuminated by knowledge of custom and usage in the industry as well as the expert’s knowledge of terms which take on a different hue in the specialized field than in the field of general knowledge.
Id. at 14.
We feel that had the expert testimony been allowed in the present case, the jury would have been better informed as to the meaning of the policy terms and the usual method of handling claims under such policies; and, therefore, better equipped to properly resolve the issues of fact. Of course, there would have been no obligation on the part of the jury to accept the testimony of the expert as proof of the ultimate facts of the case. The witness would have been subject to cross-examination by Calvert, and to rebuttal testimony by equally competent experts in the insurance field. Millar v. Tropical Gables Corporation, 99 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1958).
Since this case essentially turned on an interpretation of the parties’ rights and obligations under the Loss of Earnings Endorsements, we find that it was reversible error to exclude the expert testimony in that regard. We have considered appellants’ remaining points and find them to be without merit.
REVERSED and REMANDED for new trial.
SHAW, J., concurs.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., J., dissents without written opinion.
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Schneer v. Allstate Indem. Co., 767 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…this case, it was not necessary for their resolution of the ultimate issue of whether the Schneers had intentionally misrepresented or overinflated their contents claim. Compare, e.g., Red Carpet Corp. of Panama City Beach v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 393 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (Exclusion of expert’s testimony regarding insurance adjusting, policy provisions, and trade custom in the insurance industry error where the case essentially turned on an interpretation of the parties’ rights and obligations und…
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In re Est. OF C.J. Lenahan v. Lenahan, 511 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…However, as long as the disputed issue is beyond the ordinary understanding of the trier of fact, such expert testimony is admissible. Johnson v. State, 393 So. 2d 1069 (Fla.1980); Red Carpet Corp. of Panama City Beach v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 393 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Many courts have interpreted Section 90.703 or its equivalent Federal Rule 704 as permitting witnesses to testify as to the substantive law relevant to the case, to draw legal conclusions and to suggest to the trier of fact the…1 / 2
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Montgomery v. The AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1990)…hould not have been presented to the jury. See Part H.A., supra. . Some lower Florida courts have stated that courts may admit expert testimony on the meaning of an insurance contract. Red Carpet Corp. of Panama City Beach v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 393 So. 2d 1160, 1161 (Fla.App.1981); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Loxahatchee Marina, Inc., 236 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla.App.1970). These cases, however, appear inconsistent with the Florida Supreme Court cases holding that interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Millar v. Tropical Gables Corp., 99 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)
- Excavating v. Olmos, 286 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1973)