DEMOUS MANGRAM, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Demous Mangram appealed his enhanced sentence as a habitual felony offender under Florida law. The appellate court found two reversible errors: the trial court failed to make findings of fact showing that an extended term was necessary for public protection, and it improperly took judicial notice of a prior conviction file without proper authentication.
The enhanced sentence must be vacated because the trial court failed to make findings of fact demonstrating that an extended sentence was necessary for public protection, and the court improperly took judicial notice of the prior conviction file without proper authentication, as required by law.
[1] A court must make findings of fact demonstrating that an extended term is necessary for the protection of the public before sentencing a convicted felon as a habitual fel…
[2] Findings of fact supporting an extended sentence for a habitual felony offender may appear in the transcript of the sentencing proceedings, not solely in the written orde…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In order to sentence a convicted felon as a habitual felony offender, the court must initially find that the criteria of Section 775.084(l)(a) 1-4 are satisfied. Secondly, the court must determine whether it is necessary for the protection of the public to sentence the offender to an extended term. In doing so, the court must make findings of fact which show on their face that an extended term is necessary for the protection of the public.”
Establishes the two-part requirement for imposing enhanced sentences and the necessity of explicit findings of fact
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMangram was convicted of a crime committed on November 2, 1978, and sentenced as a habitual felony offender with an enhanced sentence under Section 77…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from the imposition of an enhanced sentence pursuant to Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1979). Two errors were committed in the sentencing of appellant as a habitual felony offender under this statute.
In order to sentence a convicted felon as a habitual felony offender, the court must initially find that the criteria of Section 775.084(l)(a) 1-4 are satisfied. Secondly, the court must determine whether it is necessary for the protection of the public to sentence the offender to an extended term. In doing so, the court must make findings of fact which show on their face that an extended term is necessary for the protection of the public. Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla.1980); Adams v. State, 376 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). The findings need not appear in the written order, but instead may appear in the transcript of the sentencing proceedings. Id.
In the instant case, no findings of fact which show on their face that an extended term is necessary for the protection of the public appear either in the written order or in the transcript of the sentencing proceedings, therefore the enhanced sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.
The court also improperly took judicial notice of a court file from the Fourth Judicial Circuit (Clay County) containing the record of a prior criminal conviction of appellant. Pursuant to the State’s notice of its request to take judicial notice, the court was under the impression that judicial notice of the entire file was mandated by Sections 90.202(6) and 90.203, Florida Statutes (1979), and did not require authentication of the file. The new evidence code applies to criminal proceedings related to crimes committed after the effective date of this code, July 1, 1979. § 90.103, Fla. Stat. (1979); In Re Florida Evidence Code, 376 So. 2d 1161 (Fla.1979). The information charging appellant lists November 2, 1978, as the date of the crime for which appellant was convicted and to which these proceedings relate, thus the new evidence code was not applicable. For the reasons stated in Kostecos v. Johnson, 85 So. 2d 594 (Fla.1956), before enactment of the new code judicial notice could not be taken of records in a case disposed of even in the same circuit. See also Glass v. Armstrong, 330 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Instead such files had to be appropriately introduced in evidence. Kostecos, supra. Prior law required that to be admissible copies of records and judicial proceedings of any court in this state had to be authenticated by attestation of the officer having charge of the records of such court. § 92.10 Fla.Stat. (1975).
The error in taking judicial notice is significant because at the enhanced sentence proceedings the prosecutor read extensively from the transcript contained in the file. Because of the lack of findings of fact it is impossible to determine on review how great a role the improperly noticed material played in the court’s determination that the enhanced sentence was necessary for the protection of the public.
Accordingly, the enhanced sentence is vacated and the cause is remanded for proceedings in light of this opinion.
ERVIN, SHAW and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Cited By
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Francesco Zambuto v. State, 413 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…r where the state filed a motion for an enhanced penalty. Yet it is also arguable that the court, on its own motion, has the authority to implement the statute. See § 775.084(3), Fla.Stat. (1979). . § 775.084(3), Fla.Stat. (1979); Mangram v. State, 392 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). . § 775.084(3)(c), Fla.Stat. (1979).…
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Marr v. State, 470 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…as 14 years old. 1 Hale, Pleas of Crown at 633-634 (1847). See People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal.3d 864, 123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P. 2d 247 (1975). . Chapter 76-237, Laws of Florida (1976), effective July 1, 1977, and not retroactive. Mangram v. State, 392 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).…
Authorities Cited
- Fredford James Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1980)
- Ulysses Adams, Jr. v. State, 376 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- In re Florida Evidence Code, 376 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1979)
- Kostecos v. Johnson, 85 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1956)
- Delmer L. Glass and Estell Glass v. Armstrong, 330 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)