TAYLOR IMPORTED MOTORS, INC., INDIVIDUALLY, AND TAYLOR IMPORTED MOTORS, INC. FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
JOYCE ARMSTRONG AND DAVID MUISE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Taylor Imported Motors and its insurer appealed a judgment finding them unable to prove the negligence of the opposing driver caused damages in a motor vehicle collision. The court reversed due to admission of improper settlement evidence that may have prejudiced the determination of negligence, and remanded for a new trial to properly address both negligence and proximate cause.
The court held that testimony regarding the settlement was inadmissible under City of Coral Gables v. Jordan and that the admission constituted non-harmless error because negligence was a close question. The court also held that proximate cause should have been addressed as an issue alongside negligence, and remanded for new trial to determine both whether appellees' driver was negligent and whether that negligence proximately caused the damages.
[1] Evidence of a settlement with a third party in the same accident is inadmissible in a negligence action when the issue of negligence is a close question.
[2] A settlement with a third party may be prejudicial error if it suggests that the defendant may have been negligent.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Testimony as to the settlement was inadmissible. City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60 (Fla.3d DCA 1966), aff'd, 191 So. 2d 38 (Fla.1966).”
Establishes that settlement evidence was improper under precedent and was therefore reversible error.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTaylor Imported Motors owned an automobile that sustained damages in an intersection collision with a vehicle driven by appellees. American States Ins…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Pretrial Stipulation cases and more on FLexlaw
HERSEY, Judge.
Taylor Imported Motors, the owner, and American States Insurance Company, the insurer, of an automobile which sustained damages in an intersection collision, appeal an adverse final judgment which determined that they had failed to show by the greater weight of the evidence that the negligence of the driver of the appellees’ vehicle proximately caused the damages.
The issues to be tried were narrowed by pre-trial stipulation and included as an issue whether appellees’ vehicle “was negligently operated.”
At the non-jury trial, evidence that American States had entered into a monetary settlement with appellees’ driver (not a party to this action) for certain personal injuries sustained by him was admitted over objection, on the theory that both drivers may have been partially at fault. The basis for this appeal is twofold: that it was prejudicial error to admit into evidence testimony as to the settlement by appellee, American States, of the claim of a third party in the same accident, and that the issue of proximate cause was not properly before the court for adjudication in light of the stipulation.
Testimony as to the settlement was inadmissible. City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60 (Fla.3d DCA 1966), aff’d, 191 So. 2d 38 (Fla.1966). The error was not harmless because the issue of negligence was a close question. But for the suggestion created by evidence of the settlement that the driver of appellants’ vehicle may have been negligent, the record might conceivably support a result contrary to that reached by the trial court.
Further, we cannot be certain whether the trial court found that appellees’ driver was not negligent or instead that his negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident.
The issue of proximate cause is not referred to in the pretrial stipulation. On the other hand the record contains no admissions on this issue. It would be an exercise in futility for this court to remand for a trial on the issue of negligence if proximate cause is not to be considered in issue. The judgment is therefore reversed and the matter remanded with directions to determine whether appellees’ driver was negligent and if so, whether that negligence was the proximate cause of appellants’ damages.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
LETTS, C. J., and DOWNEY, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Webb v. Priest, 413 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…ther the parties were dismissed by the plaintiff as a result of release or settlement or whether the parties were dismissed by the court. See, e.g., Jordan v. City of Coral Gables, 191 So. 2d 38 (Fla.1966); Taylor Imported Motors, Inc. v. Armstrong, 391 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Though it may be permissible to point to an “empty chair,” it is not permissible to point out that the “empty chair” was once a defendant in the case. We also reject appellees’ argument that Webb waived this objection. The ree-…
-
Murad Rashid Muhammad v. Toys "R" US, Inc., 668 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…een completely inappropriate to disclose this fact to the jury. We believe that counsel’s comments were patently prejudicial and may have influenced the jury to return a verdict in favor of Toys “R” Us. See Taylor Imported Motors, Inc. v. Armstrong, 391 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (but for the suggestion created by evidence of settlement, record might conceivably support a result contrary to that reached). Given the close question of negligence, and considering that the curative instruction provided by the…
-
Henry v. Beacon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 424 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…not to sue, or that any defendant has been dismissed by order of the court shall not be made known to the jury. Testimony as to the fact of a settlement is inadmissible and if allowed warrants a new trial. Taylor Imported Motors, Inc. v. Armstrong, 391 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), affirmed, 191 So. 2d 38 (Fla.1966). This rule should apply with equal or greater force where, as here, no evidence of a settlement with Enick came out during tria…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- City OF Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Janet v. Jordan and Janet V. Jordan as Administratrix of the Estate of John Ellison Jordan, 191 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1966)