JR. FOOD STORES OF WEST FLORIDA, INC., D/B/A TOM THUMB FOOD STORE # 109, TOM THUMB FOOD STORE # 118, TOM THUMB FOOD STORE # 116, TOM THUMB FOOD STORE # 111, APPELLANT,
v.
DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO, APPELLEE
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JR. Food Stores appeals an agency reprimand for selling items determined to be illegal fireworks under Florida law. The appellant challenges the constitutionality of the fireworks statute and the agency's definition of fireworks.
The items constitute illegal fireworks under the statute, and the statute is not unconstitutionally vague or an improper delegation of legislative authority. The term 'fireworks' should be construed in its ordinary sense and encompasses any item prepared to produce a visible or audible effect by combustion, explosion, deflagration, or detonation, except as specifically exempted.
[1] A statute's words of common usage should be construed in their ordinary sense.
[2] A statute is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad if it clearly defines the legislative proscription.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When words of common usage appear in a statute they should be construed in their ordinary sense.”
Establishes the principle for statutory interpretation that the ordinary meaning of common words should guide construction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring a routine license inspection on April 6, 1978, a beverage agent found and confiscated items the agent determined to be illegal fireworks from a…
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SHAW, Judge.
On April 6, 1978, while making a routine license inspection of appellant’s stores, a beverage agent found and confiscated a number of items which he determined to be illegal fireworks. The appellant was given a written reprimand and appeals the agency action on grounds that the selling of the items is not illegal because they do not fit within the definition of illegal fireworks under Chapter 791, Florida Statutes (1977). Appellant further contends that the statute is so vague as to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an agency-
The pertinent statute reads as follows:
791.01 “Fireworks” defined.-
(1) The term “fireworks” shall mean and include any combustible or explosive composition, or any substance or combination of substances, or, except as hereinafter provided, any article prepared for the purpose of producing a visible or an audible effect by combustion, explosion, deflagration or detonation, and shall include blank cartridges and toy cannons in which explosives are used, the type of balloons which require fire underneath to propel the same, firecrackers, torpedoes, skyrockets, roman candles, daygo bombs, and any fireworks containing any explosives or flammable compound or any tablets or other device containing any explosive substance.
(2) The term “fireworks” shall not include sparklers, toy pistols, toy canes, toy guns, or other devices in which paper caps containing twenty-five hundredths grains or less of explosive compound are used, providing they are so constructed that the hand cannot come in contact with the cap when in place for the explosion, and toy pistol paper caps which contain less than twenty hundredths grains of explosive mixture, the sale and use of which shall be permitted at all times.
The hearing officer found that for the purposes of Chapter 791, the term “fireworks” means and includes any item prepared for the purpose of producing a visible or audible effect by combustion, explosion, deflagration or detonation. The challenged finding of the hearing officer is in accord with legislative intent and no error has been shown in agency action adopting the hearing officer’s recommendation. When words of common usage appear in a statute they should be construed in their ordinary sense. Pedersen v. Green, 105 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1958). We do not find the statute so vague or overbroad as to leave in doubt the legislative proscription. We, therefore, reject the appellant’s “due process” challenge to the delegation of legislative authority to the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. The Division’s final order accepting the hearing officer’s recommended penalty is affirmed.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., and BOOTH, JJ., concur.
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Moncrief v. State, 415 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…s contention that the statutory definition of “runner” in Section 648.25(6) is violative of due process because of a vagueness or overbreadth is without merit. Cf. Jr. Food Stores of West Florida, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 390 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Because the order as it relates to Count I was substantially supported by the evidence, the Department was justified in rejecting the hearing officer’s recommended penalty and imposing its substituted penalty as it was one whic…
Authorities Cited
- Pedersen v. Green, 105 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1958)