IN RE THE ESTATE OF LUIGI FRESIA, DECEASED. FLOYD MOORE AND ROBERT MOORE, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE FLORIDA BANK & TRUST COMPANY OF DAYTONA BEACH, FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1980-11-19
No. 80-444
SHARP and COWART, JJ., concur.
390 So. 2d 176 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1980) Negative Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed a probate court's determination that a will provision directing the personal representative to use Floyd Moore (or alternatively Robert Moore) as the exclusive real estate agent was advisory rather than binding, allowing the bank executor to sell estate property without using the designated brokers.


Holding

The will provision directing use of Floyd Moore or Robert Moore as exclusive real estate agents was advisory only, not binding on the bank as personal representative. Language in a will directing the representative to use a particular real estate broker is not binding on the representative but rather is only advisory.


Headnotes

[1] A provision in a will directing the personal representative to use a particular real estate broker is advisory, not binding.

[2] A trial court's error in denying a party's right to an adversary proceeding is harmless when the issue involves a question of law rather than fact.

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Key Quotes

“Depending upon the intent of the testator, precatory words are sometimes mere recommendations and are sometimes mandatory.”

Establishes the general rule that precatory language in wills can be either binding or advisory depending on testator intent

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Facts & Procedural History

Luigi Fresia died with a will and four codicils. The original will appointed Floyd Moore as executor and gave him the exclusive right to sell any real…

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Opinion of the Court
COBB, Judge.

COBB, Judge.

Luigi Fresia died and left a will with four codicils. One of the paragraphs of the will appointed Floyd Moore as executor1 of the estate. Another paragraph of the will gave Floyd Moore, or in the alternative, his son, Robert Moore, the exclusive right to sell any real estate that might be in Fresia’s estate.2 The changes made by the first and second codicils are not relevant to this appeal.3 In the third codicil, Fresia deleted Floyd Moore as his executor, and replaced him with Dante Fresia, a nephew. In the fourth codicil, Fresia deleted his nephew as executor and named the Florida Bank and Trust Company of Daytona Beach as his personal representative.

The Florida Bank and Trust Company began probate proceedings on Fresia’s will and filed a petition for instructions with the court in which the bank asked the court to tell it whether the paragraph of the will directing it to use the Moores as its real estate agent was binding on the bank or if it was only advisory. The appellants objected to the notice of hearing on the petition for instructions on the ground that the proceeding was an adversary proceeding pursuant to Rule 5.025(a)(1), Florida Rules of Probate and Guardianship Procedure, and moved to continue the hearing. The appellants also answered the petition for instructions and moved to dismiss the petition for instructions. The trial court denied the objection to the notice of hearing, denied the motion for continuance, denied the motion to dismiss, and struck the answer. The trial court then found that the paragraph in question, of the will, was not binding; and that the bank could sell the real estate without' a brpker, or could use a broker of its choosing without using Floyd Moore or Robert Moore. It is this order that the appellants are appealing.

Depending upon the intent of the testator, precatory words are sometimes mere recommendations and are sometimes mandatory. 35 Fla.Jur. Wills § 286 (1961); 80 Am.Jur.2d Wills § 1168 (1975). Oftentimes, when precatory words are addressed to the personal representative (i. e., as in directing the representative to divide the bequests among the beneficiaries in a certain manner, or to invest certain assets for the benefit of a beneficiary) such words are interpreted as mandatory. 80 Am.Jur.2d Wills § 1168 (1975); 95 C.J.S. Wills § 602(b) (1957).

However, that interpretation does not apply when the decedent is directing the representative to use the services of a particular individual in a fiduciary capacity. Where a provision of a will directs the representative to use a particular attorney, Florida has aligned itself with the majority view that such language is only advisory. In re Marks Estate, 83 So. 2d 853 at 854 (Fla.1955). Where employment other than an attorney is involved, there is division among the state jurisdictions as to whether the provision of the will is binding. 1 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills § 5.5 (1960). Since a real estate broker is a fiduciary, Nantell v. Lim-Wick Const. Co., 228 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970), language in a will directing the representative to use a particular real estate broker is not binding on the representative, but rather is only advisory.

Since the trial court was construing the will by determining whether the language in question was binding or advisory, the appellants are correct in arguing that they were entitled to an adversary proceeding. However, since the issue involved is one of law rather than of fact, any error in not taking testimony was harmless.

AFFIRMED.

SHARP and COWART, JJ., concur. . The term personal representative' has subsequently replaced the term executor. § 731.-201(25), Fla.Stat. . It is my wish that my Executor, FLOYD MOORE, shall have the exclusive right to sell any real estate which might be in my estate at the time of my death. If, for any reason, the said Floyd Moore cannot act as my exclusive agent in the sale of said real estate, then it is my wish and I direct my Executor to use his son, ROBERT MOORE, as the exclusive real estate agent to sell and dispose of my said real estate.

.In the first codicil, Fresia eliminated a trust for a friend of his. In the second codicil, Fresia eliminated a specific bequest to a friend of his.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Glenn v. Roberts, 95 So. 3d 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)
    …m.... ”); Diana, 677 So. 2d at 1378 (concluding that provision in will that “request” stock be sold was not mandatory; “the crucial question remains the intent of the testator as made manifest [*274] in the will as a whole”); In re Estate of Fresia, 390 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (stating rule that depending upon the intent of the testator, precatory words are sometimes mere recommendations and are sometimes mandatory). In construing the Will as a whole, we find further evidence that it was French’s inte…
  • Diana v. Elissa Bentsen, 677 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
    …vocal obligation, when addressed to a personal representative or other fiduciary. The four Florida cases appellee cites for this proposition, Lines v. Darden, 5 Fla. 51 (1853); In re Estate of Marks, 83 So. 2d 853 (Fla.1955); In re Estate of Fresia, 390 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); and In re Estate of Rice, 406 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981), review denied, 418 So. 2d 1280 (Fla.1982), do not establish so broad or rigid a rule. In no more than one of the cited cases, moreover, can it be said that any such r…
  • Grant v. Bessemer Tr. Co. OF Fla., Inc., 117 So. 3d 830 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
    …rs to the corporation. This would be a violation of statutory duties and the public policy behind them. Two cases in Florida involve a will provision directing employment. In re Estate of Marks, 83 So. 2d 853 (Fla.1955), and In re Estate of Fresia, 390 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), involve directions to the personal representative — to hire a lawyer in the case of Marks, and a real estate agent in the case of Fresia — for the administration of the estate. Both courts held that a will provision could not co…

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