IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF WANDA LEE SCHNEIDER, APPELLANT,
v.
JACK B. SCHNEIDER, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court was bound by the parties' stipulation and could not apportion the awarded attorney's fees.
[1] A trial court is bound by the terms of a valid stipulation entered into by the parties.
[2] A stipulation in a dissolution judgment that requires one party to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the other party does not permit the court to apportion that fee betw…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing a dissolution judgment, the parties stipulated to amendments including the husband paying a reasonable attorney's fee to the wife. The trial…
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RYDER, Judge.
Wanda Lee Schneider appeals from the order awarding her attorney’s fees, alleging that the fee was apportioned contrary to a prior agreement and order. We agree and reverse.
The parties obtained a final judgment of dissolution, from which both appealed. The appeals were voluntarily dismissed after the parties stipulated to amendments to the final judgment including that:
The husband shall pay to the wife a reasonable attorney’s fee as set forth in Paragraph H of the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, said amount to be determined by the trial court upon reasonable notice to the husband and his counsel so that further testimony may be taken, and the husband can present testimony regarding said fee.
After hearing testimony that a reasonable fee would be in the area of $7,000.00, the court found that a reasonable attorney’s fee would be $7,425.00. The court ordered the appellee to pay two-thirds of that fee, or $4,950.00. On rehearing, the court added supplemental fees of $325.00 and costs of $481.07.
' Appellant urges that the court had no discretion at that stage to remake the terms of a valid property settlement as evidenced by the stipulation, and thus could not apportion the fees. We agree that the lower court was bound by the stipulation. See Borowiak v. Borowiak, 341 So. 2d 286 (Fla.2d DC A 1977). We note that the agreement provides for award of a reasonable fee to appellant and does not provide for apportionment of that fee. Having found that a reasonable fee was $7,425.00, the court’s judicial labor was complete. The trial court had no lawful basis on which to apportion that fee between the parties.
The order awarding fees is reversed, and the case remanded for entry of an order awarding appellant fees of $7,425.00 and costs of $481.07. We grant appellant’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees, and direct the lower court to determine the amount of a reasonable appellate attorney’s fee to be awarded to appellant.
BOARDMAN, Acting C. J., and OTT, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Sierra v. Sierra, 505 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1987)…hy appellate courts should not also be precluded from assessing the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded without an evidentiary basis. Indeed, most district courts remand under the circumstances presented in this case. See Schneider v. Schneider, 389 So. 2d 311, 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 380 So. 2d 1195, 1197 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Dresser v. Dresser, 350 So. 2d 1152, 1153-54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Ludemann v. Ludemann, 317 So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). In Ludemann, the Fourth Distr…
Authorities Cited
- Anne Lois Borowiak v. Borowiak, 341 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)