CITY OF WINTER PARK AND IOWA NATIONAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
WILLIAM BOWEN, APPELLEE
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Florida workers' compensation appeal affirming that an employee permanently and totally disabled by both physical injuries and resultant traumatic neurosis from a workplace assault is entitled to workers' compensation benefits, but remanding to determine the proper commencement date for permanent total disability payments.
The employee is entitled to permanent total disability benefits where physical trauma is complicated by traumatic neurosis, and the full disability including neurotic effects is compensable. However, permanent total disability benefits should commence from the date of maximum medical improvement rather than from the date of accident.
[1] When a claimant's disability is increased or prolonged by traumatic neurosis or hysterical paralysis resulting from a physical accident or trauma, the full disability, in…
[2] An award of permanent total disability benefits is supported by competent substantial evidence when factors such as medical and psychiatric evidence, and testimony of a v…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When there has been a physical accident or trauma and the claimant's disability is increased or prolonged by traumatic neurosis or hysterical paralysis, the full disability including the effects of the neurosis is compensable.”
Establishes that workers' compensation covers both physical injury and resulting psychological disability from workplace trauma.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn May 1976, Bowen was attacked by a co-worker with a ballpeen hammer, sustaining injuries to his face, chest, low back, and stomach. He was examined …
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm the order of the judge of industrial claims finding the claimant-ap-pellee permanently and totally disabled, and awarding attorney’s fees to claimant’s attorney.
In May, 1976, appellee suffered an industrial accident when he was attacked by a co-worker with a ballpeen hammer, sustaining injuries to his face, chest, low back and stomach. He was seen by a succession of doctors including orthopedists, psychiatrists, and a chiropractor. Based upon the medical and psychiatric evidence, and the testimony of a certified vocational expert, the judge of industrial claims found the claimant to be permanently and totally disabled. We find no error in this award. When there has been a physical accident or trauma and the claimant’s disability is increased or prolonged by traumatic neurosis or hysterical paralysis, the full disability including the effects of the neurosis is compensable. IB Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law § 42.22 (1952), Superior Mill Work v. Gabel, 89 So. 2d 794 (Fla.1956). We find that the factors stated in Walker v. Electronic Products and Engineering Company, 248 So. 2d 161 (Fla.1971), were fully considered and that the award of permanent total disability is supported by competent substantial evidence.
Appellants contend, however, that even if the award of permanent total dis-
ability is sustained, the order contains error in that it provides for permanent total disability benefits from the date of the accident, without consideration of the date of maximum medical improvement. We agree this was error. See Saga Food Services, Inc. v. Piscopo, IRC Order 2-2934 (March 12, 1976); City of Miami v. Wright, 380 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Here there was evidence of curative treatment and an obvious period of recuperation during which the claimant was either totally or partially disabled. We therefore remand for the purpose of allowing the deputy commissioner to determine the date of maximum medical improvement, and to modify his order with respect to the commencement of payment of permanent total disability benefits.
The order is affirmed in part, reversed in part.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., LARRY G. SMITH and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
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Racz v. Chennault, Inc., 418 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…een a physical accident and claimant’s disability is increased or prolonged by traumatic neurosis or conversion hysteria, the claimant’s full disability, including the effects of the neurosis, is compensable. See, e.g., City of Winter Park v. Bowen, 388 So. 2d 1376, 1377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Lar-sons Workmens Compensation Law § 42.-22. Since the AMA Guides also include criteria for assigning permanent impairment based on psychiatric or mental illness, this contention is without merit. The deputy also erred in…
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Blackshear v. Bethune Cookman Coll. & Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 467 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…rolonged by traumatic neurosis or conversion hysteria, the claimant’s full disability, including the effects of the neurosis, is com-pensable.” Racz v. Chennault, Inc., 418 So. 2d 413, 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). See also: City of Winter Park v. Bowen, 388 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The deputy’s order contains an express finding that claimant suffered a work related injury. In addition, the testimony of claimant’s treating physician constitutes competent substantial 'evidence, based on reasonable medical p…
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Division of Workers' Compensation v. Yale Brevda, 420 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…o him by appellee. By analogy, in workers’ compensation claims, an employer/carrier may be required to furnish psychiatric treatment if a claimant’s psychological disorder is causally referable to a physical injury. See City of Winter Park v. Bowen, 388 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), and Lake v. Irwin Yacht & Marine Co., 398 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). As to appellant’s contention that there is no authorization under Chapter 960 for the assessment of costs against the Bureau, appellee concedes the point…
Authorities Cited
- THE Florida BAR v. Lemlich, 248 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1971)
- Therber v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 89 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1956)
- City OF Miami v. Wright, 380 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)