CITY OF JACKSONVILLE FIRE DIVISION AND GALLAGHER BASSETT INSURANCE SERVICE, APPELLANTS,
v.
MITCHELL J. MCDANIEL, APPELLEE
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a workers' compensation award of permanent partial disability based on psychological impairment, holding that the judge of industrial claims prematurely found permanency without evidence that the injured worker could not respond to further psychological treatment. The court remanded for the worker to attempt additional treatment before permanent disability benefits could be awarded.
The court reversed the permanent partial disability award because it had not been satisfactorily demonstrated that the worker could not respond to further psychological care, making the permanency finding premature. Before permanent partial benefits could be awarded, the worker must attempt further treatment, and only if that treatment shows no improvement will permanent disability benefits be appropriate.
[1] An award of permanent partial disability benefits is premature when it has not been demonstrated that the injured worker cannot respond to further recommended medical tre…
[2] An injured worker may be denied benefits if they unreasonably refuse to undergo medical treatment that does not involve serious suffering or danger of serious harm.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An injured worker may be denied benefits when she or he unreasonably refuses to undergo treatment "which does not involve serious suffering or danger of serious harm . . . ."”
Establishes the standard for denying benefits based on treatment refusal, requiring the treatment to be reasonable and not involve serious risk.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcDaniel, a combat firefighter, suffered two work-related back injuries in 1976 and 1977, each followed by laminectomy surgery. A psychologist testifi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
The employer and carrier appeal the judge of industrial claims’ award of 66 percent permanent partial disability (based on 25 percent physical impairment to the body as a whole and 20 to 40 percent psychological impairment) and award of fees to the psychologist who testified for the claimant. Appellee, in turn, cross-appeals that he should have been found permanently, totally disabled and that the interest rate on the award should have been 12 percent instead of six percent. We reverse in part.
McDaniel, a combat firefighter (periodically called upon to handle medical emergencies and rescues), injured his back in a 1976 on-the-job accident. After a laminec-tomy, he was released with a ten percent permanent partial disability rating in February 1977. He suffered a second job-related back injury in November 1977, and after yet another laminectomy his doctor stated he had a 25 percent permanent disability to the body as a whole.
A psychologist, Dr. Reynolds, found appellee to have a 20-to 40 percent permanent psychological disability caused by the accidents and his physical injuries. Dr. Reynolds said McDaniel, because of the psychological damage from his injuries, should not continue his current employment (he was still a combat firefighter at the time of the hearing). The key testimony, however, was Dr. Reynolds’ statement that there was a chance appellee would improve with further psychological or psychiatric treatment but had rejected such treatment. The psychologist said appellee should not be ordered to undergo more treatment because he would only resist it and thereby render it useless. The JIC accepted Dr. Reynolds’ evaluation and found appellee permanently, partially disabled, as described above.
We reverse the award because it has not been satisfactorily demonstrated that appellee could not respond to further psychological care, so a permanency finding was premature. An injured worker may be denied benefits when she or he unreasonably refuses to undergo treatment “which does not involve serious suffering or danger of serious harm ....” Twisdale v. Womack & Martel, 148 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla.1962). Before the JIC may award permanent partial benefits in this case, further treatment must be attempted. If after a period of treatment appellee shows no improvement, then the requirement of Twisdale, supra, will have been met and the JIC may award an appropriate percentage of permanent disability.
Our holding on this issue resolves two of appellant’s three points and both of appellee’s points on cross-appeal. As to the award of Dr. Reynolds’ fee, because his examination and testimony provided direct input into the JIC’s deliberations in this case, the fees were properly taxed as costs against the employer/carrier. Reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MILLS, C. J., and McCORD and WENT-WORTH, JJ., concur.
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Wright v. Golf Drive Residence, Inc., 412 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…s a whole with an appropriate set-off for the previous (1973) settlement, social security benefits as may be appropriate, and any permanent partial disability paid since the stipulated date of MMI. In City of Jacksonville Fire Division v. McDaniel, 388 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), we reversed an award of permanent partial disability benefits as premature, since the deputy simultaneously found claimant to be in need of further psychiatric care. The facts of this case are quite similar, in that the deputy f…
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Cedars OF Lebanon Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Summerset, 409 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…e do not view claimant’s expressed opposition to psychological evaluation as an “unreasonable refusal” to undergo necessary treatment so as to bar her later claim for the expense of such treatment. Cf. City of Jacksonville Fire Division v. McDaniel, 388 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Such evaluation and treatment was never offered nor ordered by the E/C.…
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T.G. & Y. Stores & G.A.B. Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Miller, 472 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…n of reasonableness may vary between quite similar factual situations on the basis of the presence of some minor consideration.” Id. at 352. The likelihood of improvement is an important consideration. City of Jacksonville Fire Division v. McDaniel, 388 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). [*511] In the instant case, the deputy found claimant’s refusal to undergo mye-lography and any other “dangerous and invasive” diagnostic procedures to be reasonable. While the refusal to undergo myelography was reasonable, ther…
Authorities Cited
- Twisdale v. Womack & Martel, 148 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1962)