FLOYD DANFORD, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
CITY OF ROCKLEDGE ET AL., APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
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Floyd Danford, a police officer, sued the City of Rockledge and various officials for wrongful discharge, defamation, and conspiracy. The trial court dismissed claims against city officials based on absolute privilege for actions within the scope of office, granted summary judgment against some defendants, and denied it against others. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of city officials while addressing jurisdictional issues with the summary judgment orders.
City officials are absolutely privileged for actions taken within the scope of their offices, including statements made to the news media under the circumstances alleged. Orders granting summary judgment that lack traditional finality language are not final judgments subject to appellate review. The dismissal of claims against the city manager and councilmen was proper.
[1] Orders granting summary judgment are not final and thus not appealable unless they contain language of finality.
[2] A cross-appeal seeking review of the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not appealable.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Without such language, the orders are not final judgments subject to appellate review.”
Establishes that summary judgment orders lacking finality language are not appealable, a jurisdictional requirement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDanford was employed as a police officer by the City of Rockledge and filed a complaint against the city, its manager, two city councilmen, the police…
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COBB, Judge.
Danford was employed as a police officer by the City of Rockledge. Danford filed a complaint against the City of Rockledge, Hipp (city manager), Rainwater and Chas-tain (city councilmen), Kallis (chief of police), and Ellis, Hurst, Pennington, Williams, Robinson and Massey (police officers). The complaint sought damages for wrongful discharge, defamation, tortious interference with a contract of employment, and conspiracy to defame.
All defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and all defendants also moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss with regard to the city manager and the two city councilmen, without leave to amend. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment with regard to the City of Rockledge and the chief of police, and denied the motion for summary judgment with regard to the six police officers. No final summary judgment was entered. Danford appealed those portions of the order granting the motion to dismiss and granting summary judgment. The city manager and the two city councilmen cross-appealed the denial of the motion for summary judgment with regard to themselves.
The six police officers subsequently filed a second motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted that motion. No final summary judgment was entered. Danford then appealed that order, in addition.
First, we shall dispose of those portions of the appeals dealing with the two orders granting summary judgments. A review of both of the orders shows that neither of the orders contains either the traditional words of finality nor other words of similar import. Without such language, the orders are not final judgments subject to appellate review. Guth v. Howard, 362 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Armstrong Contracting and Supply Corp. v. Aerospace Industries, Inc., 254 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971); Catchings v. Florida-McCracken Concrete Pipe Co., 101 Fla. 792, 135 So. 561 (1931).
Second, we shall dispose of the cross-appeal. The cross-appeal seeks review of the denial of a motion for summary judgment. Such an order is not appealable. Mooney v. Integon Life Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
Third, we shall consider the merits of the order dismissing the case without leave to amend with regard to the city manager and the two city councilmen. In his complaint, Danford basically alleged that these three city officials made certain unfavorable statements to the news media about him. In Florida, executive officials have an absolute privilege for actions taken within the scope of their offices. Our Florida Supreme Court had adopted a broad definition of the phrase “scope of office.” McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d 428 (Fla.1966); Hauser v. Urchisin, 231 So. 2d 6 (Fla.1970).1 We think that the statements of these city officials made under circumstances-alleged in the complaint were made by these individuals acting within the scope of their offices. Therefore, they were absolutely privileged and the complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action with regard to these city officials.
Accordingly, we affirm the order dismissing the complaint with regard to Hipp, Chastain, and Rainwater; we sua sponte dismiss the cross-appeal; and we remand this case to the trial court for thirty days so that proper appealable final summary judgments may be rendered and supplemented into the record on appeal. If such action is not taken within that time, then the appeal of the orders granting the motions for summary judgment will be dismissed.
DAUKSCH, C. J., and UPCHURCH, J., concur. . McNayr has been followed in Roberts v. Lenfestey, 264 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); Johnson v. Carhart, 353 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Densmore v. City of Boca Raton, 368 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
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Cited By (16 total)
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Monticello Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 743 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…nted that the plaintiff take nothing by the suit and go hence without day” was final, appealable order; use of additional language “len[t] the necessary unequivocal declaration of finality that will support an appeal”); Danford v. City of Rockledge, 387 So. 2d 967, 968 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)(or-ders granting motions for summary judgment, which contained neither “the traditional words of finality nor other words of similar import,” were not final orders subject to appellate review). Although we recognize that our…
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Hoffman v. Hall, 817 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…ted that the plaintiff take nothing by this suit and go hence without day” was final, appealable order; use of additional language “len[t] the necessary unequivocal declaration of finality that will support an appeal”); Danford v. City of Rockledge, 387 So. 2d 967, 968 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)(orders granting motions for summary judgment, which contained neither “the traditional words of finality nor other words of similar import,” were not final orders subject to appellate review). Where an order stated that “fin…
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Lidsky Vaccaro & Montes, P.A. v. Morejon, 813 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…Cracken Concrete Pipe Co., 101 Fla. 792, 135 So. 561 (Fla.1931); Armstrong Contracting & Supply Corp. v. Aerospace Industries, Inc., 254 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971); Guth v. Howard, 362 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Danford v. City of Rockledge, 387 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). An order granting only summary judgment merely establishes an entitlement to a judgment, but is not itself a judgment. See Monticello Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 743 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Thus, the earlier order which merel…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- McNAYR v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1966)
- Hauser v. Urchisin, 231 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1970)
- Emory Catchings v. Florida-McCracken Concrete Pipe Co., 101 Fla. 792 (Fla. 1931)
- Hilsenroth v. Kessler, 353 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Guth v. Nell F. Howard, 362 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Garcia v. Jarvis Corp. & Travelers Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Armstrong Contracting & Supply Corp. v. Aerospace Indus., Inc., 254 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Lopez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Roberts v. Lenfestey, 264 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- Danford v. City OF Rockledge, 387 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)