JOHN J. SCUSSEL AND PAUL WOLF, APPELLANTS,
v.
DAVID BALTER, APPELLEE
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The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a jury verdict finding that John Scussel tortiously interfered with an advantageous business relationship between David Balter and Paul Wolf through malicious conduct. The court rejected Scussel's contentions that he could not be liable without proof of a specific contractual breach and that his actions were protected by an agent's privilege to give honest advice.
An action for intentional interference with a business expectancy lies even from an unenforceable agreement when the understanding would have been complied with but for the defendant's improper intervention. The privilege afforded an agent to give honest advice is inapplicable when the record shows active involvement, personal motivations, and ulterior purposes in securing the withdrawal from the business relationship.
[1] An action for intentional interference with a business expectancy lies even when the underlying agreement is unenforceable, provided the understanding would have been hon…
[2] An agent's privilege to advise a principal to breach a contract does not apply when the agent acts with personal motivations and ulterior purposes in securing the breach.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an action lies for intentional interference with a business expectancy which arises even from an unenforceable agreement when, as the jury could find in this case, the understanding would have been complied with if the defendant had not improperly intervened”
Establishes that tortious interference protection extends beyond enforceable contracts to business expectancies when improper intervention prevents performance
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavid Balter had a business understanding with Paul Wolf. John Scussel actively involved himself in Wolf's affairs and, motivated by personal interest…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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SCHWARTZ, Judge.
This appeal is from a judgment for compensatory and punitive damages entered pursuant to a jury verdict finding that the appellant John Scussel,1 one of the defendants below, had maliciously interfered with an advantageous business relationship between the plaintiff David Balter and Paul Wolf.2 Scussel claims the right to the entry of judgment in his favor on two separate grounds. We find no merit in either and affirm.
Scussel first contends that he could not be found to have tortiously interfered with the Balter-Wolf relationship because there was no showing that Wolf violated any specific contractual obligation he owed Balter. We need not determine whether this was in fact the case. This is so because an action lies for intentional interference with a business expectancy which arises even from an unenforceable agreement when, as the jury could find in this case, the understanding would have been complied with if the defendant had not improperly intervened. United Yacht Brokers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 377 So. 2d 668 (Fla.1979), and cases cited; John B. Reid & Associates, Inc. v. Jimenez, 181 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965).
Scussel secondly suggests that his actions were protected by the privilege afforded an agent3 who, upon request, gives “honest advice” that it is in his principal’s best interests to breach an existing relationship. See 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 772(b) (1979). We find, however, that the showings in the record of Scussel’s active involvement in Wolf’s affairs and of his personal motivations and ulterior purposes for securing Wolfs withdrawal from his undertaking with Balter demonstrate the inapplicability of this principle. See London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493, 69 N.E. 526 (1903); Morgan v. Andrews, 107 Mich. 33, 64 N.W. 869 (1895); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 129 text and authorities at 944, nn. 5-7 (4th ed. 1971).
Affirmed.
. We have considered other aspects of the action, as they relate to other defendants, in Balter v. Pan American Bank of Hialeah, 383 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Balter v. Frank, 386 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); and Ethyl Corp. v. Balter, 386 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
. The jury also found and judgment was entered against Wolf. See Ethyl Corp. v. Balter, supra, note 5. While Wolf initially joined in the notice of appeal in this case, he has since abandoned the appeal and the judgment against him is therefore affirmed without further discussion.
.Scussel improperly represented himself as Wolfs attorney and was disciplined for doing so by the supreme court in Florida Bar v. Scussel, 240 So. 2d 153 (Fla.1970).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Politis v. Gen. Hotel & Rest. Supply Corp., 386 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- United Yacht Brokers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 377 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1979)
- Emil Morton v. The Mastan Co., Inc., 181 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Balter v. PAN Am. Bank OF Hialeah, 383 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Balter v. Frank, 386 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- THE Florida BAR v. Scussel, 240 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1970)