MORGAN YACHT CORPORATION/BEATRICE FOODS AND GALLAGHER BASSETT INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
NEIL J. EDWARDS, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1980-08-18
No. QQ-149
McCORD and BOOTH, JJ., concur.
386 So. 2d 883 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1980) Caution
Cited by 18 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A Judge of Industrial Claims denied a motion to set aside a workers' compensation settlement, claiming lack of authority to rescind orders. The appellate court reversed, holding that judges of industrial claims have inherent authority under Florida law to set aside settlements obtained through fraud and misrepresentation.


Holding

A Judge of Industrial Claims has authority to set aside orders based on fraud and misrepresentation. This authority derives from Florida Statute Section 440.33(1), which grants judges of industrial claims authority to do all things necessary to discharge their duties. It would be inconceivable to grant authority to approve settlements without authority to rescind them when obtained fraudulently.


Headnotes

[1] A Judge of Industrial Claims has the authority to set aside an order approving a settlement obtained by fraud and misrepresentation.

[2] Judges of Industrial Claims possess the authority to take all actions conformable to law that are necessary to discharge their duties, including vacating orders procured…

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Key Quotes

“It would be inconceivable to give a Judge of Industrial Claims authority to approve á settlement but no authority to rescind his action when it is based on misrepresentations and fraud.”

Establishes the core logical principle supporting judicial authority to set aside fraudulent settlements.

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Facts & Procedural History

Claimant injured his right shoulder in a workplace accident on June 27, 1978, diagnosed as a partial rotator cuff tear. He settled with the employer/c…

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Opinion of the Court
MILLS, Chief Judge.

MILLS, Chief Judge.

Appellants (E/C) appeal an order of a Judge of Industrial Claims denying their motion to set aside an order approving a settlement obtained by appellee’s (claimant) fraud and misrepresentations because the Judge concluded he lacked authority to set aside the order. We do not agree and reverse.

Claimant injured his right shoulder in an industrial accident on 27 June 1978. The injury was diagnosed as a partial tear of the right rotator cuff. The shoulder injury, merging with a prior left arm amputation, resulted in claimant’s being rated at 30% permanent partial disability of the body as a whole. He filed a claim for benefits.

Claimant and E/C reached a settlement by joint petition and stipulation agreeing to a 45% permanent partial disability to 'the body and $2,325 as future medical expenses. This stipulation was entered into based on the claimant’s testimony that he had not previously had an injury to his right shoulder and that he was unable to find employment after 200 unsuccessful attempts. The settlement was approved at a hearing on 27 November 1978.

Subsequently, E/C learned that claimant had previously injured his right shoulder in an automobile accident and this injury had been diagnosed as a torn right rotator cuff. Also, at the time the joint petition and stipulation was entered, claimant was employed at an annual salary of $10,700.

Based on this information, E/C filed a motion to modify and/or rescind the joint petition and order because the settlement and the order based thereon resulted from claimant’s misrepresentations. A hearing was held on E/C’s motion. The JIC found that claimant lied at the settlement hearing about his employment status, the origin and cause of his injury, fraudulently concealed the origin of his injuries, and fraudulently induced E/C to settle his claim. The JIC found however that he had neither statutory nor inherent authority to set aside a judgment obtained by fraud. E/C’s motion was denied and dismissed with prejudice.

The order under attack clearly and unequivocally finds that the settlement and order approving the settlement were brought about by claimant’s misrepresentations and fraud. It would be inconceivable to give a Judge of Industrial Claims authority to approve á settlement but no authority to rescind his action when it is based on misrepresentations and fraud.

It is our opinion that a Judge of Industrial Claims has this authority. Section 440.-33(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provides that a Judge of Industrial Claims has authority to do all things conformable to law which may be necessary to discharge the duties of the office. Setting aside orders based on flagrant fraud and misrepresentations as present in this case is an authority granted by Section 440.33(1).

The order appealed is reversed and the order approving the settlement is vacated and set aside.

McCORD and BOOTH, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …designated individual competent to administer oaths; examine witnesses; and do all things conformable to law which may be necessary to enable him effectively to discharge the duties of his office. (Emphasis added.) In Morgan Yacht Corp. v. Edwards, 386 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), section 440.33(1) was interpreted as giving a JCC the authority to rescind his approval of a settlement upon discovering that the settlement was based on the claimant’s “flagrant fraud and misrepresentations.” Id. at 884; s…
  • Threat v. Rogers, 443 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
    …excusable neglect, as in the case at issue. See, Acosta Roofing Co. v. Gillyard, 402 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), in which this court found such authority in Section 440.25(4)(a), Florida Statutes. See also, Morgan Yacht Corporation v. Edwards, 386 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), which found that Section 440.-33(1), Florida Statutes, authorized the deputy to rescind his approval of settlement stipulations upon a finding of fraud. It is within the deputy’s discretion to determine whether the facts of a…
  • Drexel Props., Inc. v. Brown, 443 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
    …o. 2d 1321, 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), authorizing 30-day corrections of inadvertent errors in order to “discourage substantially groundless and unnecessary appeals” on matters that might readily be tended to below, nor Morgan Yacht Cory. v. Edwards, 386 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), authorizing rehearings for fraud in connection with settlement stipulations and their approval, extends to such a case as this. Conventional rehearings on substantial issues decided by a deputy are not authorized. Extraordinary…

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