JAMES T. VOCELLE, AS DIRECTOR OF THE BEVERAGE DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
v.
TALLAHASSEE LODGE NO. 937 OF THE BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the Director of the Beverage Department's cancellation of a liquor license issued to an Elks Lodge in Leon County, a dry county where the sale of intoxicating liquors is prohibited. The court held that liquor licenses under Florida law carry an implicit permission to sell liquors in counties where such sales are lawful, and therefore cannot be validly issued in dry counties.
The Director properly canceled the license because liquor licenses under Section 561.34(11) F.S. 1941 implicitly permit the licensee to deal in liquors in counties where such sales are lawful, and the statute contains no provision for issuing such licenses in dry counties where liquor sales are prohibited.
“Since a license issued under 561.34 (11) F.S. 1941 carries the implication that the licensee is permitted to deal in liquors "regardless of alcoholic content" as if in a "wet" county where the sale of such liquors is lawful and since the law makes no provision for the issuance of liquor licenses "regardless of alcoholic content" in dry counties where the sale of such liquor is prohibited it appears that the petitioner was well justified in cancelling the license theretofore issued by him.”
This establishes the court's reasoning that the license statute implicitly assumes a wet county context and therefore cannot be applied in dry counties.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn September 25, 1946, the Elks Lodge was issued a liquor license under Section 561.34(1) F.S. 1941 to serve and distribute intoxicating liquors to it…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Injunction cases and more on FLexlaw
The Elks’ Lodge-respondent brought a bill against the petitioner, Director Vocelle and alleged that on September 25, 1946, it had been issued a liquor license to serve and distribute to its members intoxicating liquors as provided by Section 561.34 (1) F.S. 1941; said bill further alleges that the appellee Vocelle had on the 25th day of June 1947, caused the plaintiff-respondent to be served with a notice of the cancellation of said liquor license.
The prayer of the bill was that the defendant-petitioner be enjoined from enforcing the order of cancellation.
The chancellor granted a temporary injunction enjoining enforcement of the cancellation of said license and thereafter denied petitioner’s motion to dissolve the temporary injunctions and denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss the bill which orders the petitioner-Vocelle seeks to have this Court review.
Leon County is a “dry” county wherein it is unlawful to sell intoxicating liquors “regardless of alcoholic content” and paragraph (11) of 561.34 F.S. 1941 is controlled by the language which precedes it as follows:
“The following license taxes shall apply to vendors who sell in counties where the sale of intoxicating liquors, wines and beers is permitted and who are permitted to sell any such beverages regardless of alcoholic content:”
Since a license issued under 561.34 (11) F.S. 1941 carries the implication that the licensee is permitted to deal in liquors “regardless of alcoholic content” as if in a “wet” county where the sale of such liquors is lawful and since the law makes no provision for the issuance of liquor licenses “regardless of alcoholic content” in dry counties where the sal'e of such liquor is prohibited it appears that the petitioner was well justified in cancelling the license theretofore issued by him. Section 561.34 (11) supra has no application to “dry” counties.
The petition is granted, the writ of certiorari issued and, the order denying motion to dissolve injunction is quashed and ordered granted, and, likewise, the order denying motion to dismiss bill of complaint is quashed and ordered granted.
THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, BUFORD, CHAPMAN, ADAMS and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Rolling Greens Country Club v. Brautigam, 255 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)…, § 5, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1935. . Ch. 18016, §§ 1, 2, 5, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1937, codified as F.S. §§ 568.01, 568.02, 568.03, F.S.A. .Vocelle v. Tallahassee Lodge No. 937 of Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks (1947), 169 Fla. 615, 32 So. 2d 280, 281. . Ch. 23746, § 5, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1947, § 561.34(11) now recodified as F.S. § 561.34(6), F.S.A.. . F.S. § 561.56, F.S.A. . U.S.S. Tampa Post No. 5 of American Legion v. Schleman, (Fla.1951) 53 So. 2d 302. . Meiklejohn v. Pensacola…