JANIE MCCRAY, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed the termination of AFDC benefits for three minor children in June 1979 and the denial of benefits for a fourth child upon re-application in July 1979, holding that the hearing officer properly weighed competent, substantial evidence supporting both decisions despite conflicting evidence in the record.
The hearing officer properly terminated AFDC benefits for three minor children and denied benefits for a fourth child upon re-application because competent, substantial evidence supported both decisions, and the hearing officer had discretion to weigh and reject conflicting evidence.
[1] A hearing officer's decision to terminate or deny AFDC benefits is properly upheld on appeal when competent, substantial evidence supports the decision, even if conflicti…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services terminated AFDC benefits for three minor children in June 1979 and denied benefits for a fourth c…
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PER CURIAM.
The final administrative order under review is affirmed upon a holding that: (a) the termination of AFDC benefits in June 1979 as to the subject three minor children was properly upheld by the hearing officer below as there was competent, substantial evidence in the record to support such a termination [to wit, an AFDC program sheet in an audit report which was admissible below under the law of evidence as a business record and a statement of fact concerning family history], which result is not changed by the presence of other conflicting evidence in the record [to wit, a written statement by Calvin McCray II] because the hearing officer as the trier of fact was privileged to weigh and reject such conflicting evidence, G & B of Jacksonville, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Business Regulation, Div. of Beverage, 362 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); §§ 90.803(6), (13), 120.68(10), Fla.Stat. (1979); Fla.Admin.Code Rule 10-2.60(1); see De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla.1957); and (b) the denial of AFDC benefits upon re-application in July 1979 as to the minor child Calvin McCray III was properly upheld by the hearing officer below as there was competent, substantial evidence in the record to support such a denial of benefits notwithstanding other contrary evidence in the record which the hearing officer was privileged to reject. G & B of Jacksonville, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Business Regulation, Div. of Beverage, 362 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); § 120.68(10), Fla.Stat. (1979); Fla.Admin.Code Rule 10-2.60(2).
Affirmed.
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Ritenour v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 570 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…the legal standard for “good cause.” An appeals referee is the trier of fact, and he or she is privileged to weigh and reject conflicting evidence. David Clark & Associates v. Kennedy, 390 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); McCray v. Dept. of H.R.S., 384 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980). The question of whether a claimant left work voluntarily is a question of fact. Verner v. State Unemployment Appeals Commission, 474 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Here there is no question the appellant left voluntarily. But th…
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David Clark & Assocs., Inc. v. Lowell E. Kennedy, Jr., 390 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)…357, 1358 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1978). The reason for this is that the hearing officer or appeals referee in an administrative proceeding is the trier of fact, and he or she is privileged to weigh and reject conflicting evidence. McCray v. Dept. of H.R.S., 384 So. 2d 980 (Fla.3d DCA 1980). The principles discussed above apply with equal weight to an attempted modification of a hearing officer’s determinations under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. See Samson v. Bureau of Community Medical Facilities Planning of Dept.…
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Forkey & Kirsch, P. A. v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 407 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…ased on substantial competent evidence. Citrus Central v. Detwiler, 368 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Taylor v. State Dept. of Labor and Employment Security, 383 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); McCray v. Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 384 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); David Clark & Associates, Inc. v. Kennedy, supra. We find the decision of the appeals referee was supported by substantial competent evidence, and must be upheld. The decision of the Unemployment Appeals Commission is reversed…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- de Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957)
- G & B OF Jacksonville, Inc. v. State, 362 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)