GEORGE LOCKE, APPELLANT,
v.
MAXINE LOCKE, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida appellate court reversed a property division order because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter it outside the reserved 90-day period, requiring division of tenancy-by-entireties property as tenancy-in-common under Fla. Stat. § 689.15.
A trial court that reserves jurisdiction for only 90 days to determine property rights and support payments loses jurisdiction to enter such orders after that period expires, converting tenancy-by-entireties property to tenancy-in-common by operation of law.
[1] When a trial court reserves jurisdiction for a limited period to determine property rights and support in a dissolution action, it loses jurisdiction to enter such orders…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court dissolved the marriage between George and Maxine Locke and reserved jurisdiction for 90 days to determine property rights and support …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Jurisdictional Limitations cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The order determining property rights and support payments which is under review by this appeal is reversed on a holding that: (a) the trial court’s prior interlocutory order herein dissolving the marriage between the parties and reserving jurisdiction “for the next 90 day period for the purpose of determining the property rights and support payments on a permanent basis,” although perfectly proper, specifically limited the trial court’s jurisdiction to enter the order appealed from within the specified 90 day jurisdictional period, (b) the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the order appealed from as it was entered far beyond the 90 day jurisdictional period previously reserved by the trial court, and (c) Section 689.15, Florida Statutes (1979), became applicable by operation of law upon expiration of the above 90 day jurisdictional period so that all property held by the parties as tenants by the entireties at the time of the marriage dissolution thereafter became converted into property held as tenants in common. The cause is, accordingly, remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the order under review and to enter an order dividing all marital property held at the time of the marriage dissolution in accordance with Section 689.15, Florida Statutes (1979). Hyman v. Hyman, 310 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Dieter Gunther Protz v. Protz, 440 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…way that did not nullify the specific proviso which conditioned the 120-day lapse on the absence of petition by either party. This case is simply not comparable to those in which the period of reserved jurisdiction is not so defined. Locke v. Locke, 383 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). There appears to me to be no issue presented as to the trial court’s general authority to reserve jurisdiction, or to its authority to define that reservation in terms that permit completion of the exercise of jurisdiction over a…
Authorities Cited
- Hyman v. Hyman, 310 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)