JAMES E. ALFORD, PETITIONER,
v.
LON S. CORNELIUS, JR., CIRCUIT JUDGE OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR ORANGE COUNTY, RESPONDENT
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James Alford sought a writ of prohibition claiming he was compelled to testify in another person's criminal trial and should receive transactional immunity from prosecution under Florida law. The court denied the petition, holding that Alford's testimony about a July 1978 hub cap transaction had no substantial connection to the April 1979 charges against him for trafficking in different hub caps, and therefore he was entitled only to use immunity, not transactional immunity.
Alford is not entitled to transactional immunity because his compelled testimony regarding the July 1978 hub cap transaction had no substantial connection to the April 1979 charges against him. However, he is entitled to use immunity, meaning his testimony cannot be used against him in his own prosecution, but he may still be prosecuted for the April charges.
[1] A witness compelled to testify in a criminal proceeding is granted use immunity for that testimony, but transactional immunity only if the testimony is relevant to and ha…
[2] Compelled testimony regarding one transaction does not grant transactional immunity for a separate, unconnected offense, even if the testimony incidentally reveals inform…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To gain 'transactional' immunity the compelled testimony must be 'relevant to and have substantial connection with the subject of inquiry'.”
Establishes the legal standard required for transactional immunity under Florida law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAlford was charged with trafficking in stolen property involving four 1969 Chevrolet hub caps on April 12, 1979. He was compelled to testify in a sepa…
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SHARP, Judge.
The petitioner, James E. Alford, filed a petition for writ of prohibition to this court. He urges that he was compelled, over his Fifth Amendment objection, to testify in a criminal proceeding involving another person, and therefore he should have been given immunity from prosecution pursuant to Section 914.04, Florida Statutes (1979). The transcript of the proceeding was furnished to this court. After reviewing it, we disagree with the petitioner that his testimony was relevant to the current charges or that there was any substantial connection or link between the two. Accordingly, we deny the petition.
The petitioner was charged with “trafficking” in stolen property, specifically four 1969 Chevrolet hub caps, on April 12, 1979. His testimony was “compelled” at a criminal proceeding involving a different defendant who was charged with selling other stolen hub caps to the petitioner on approximately July 3, 1978. The petitioner testified that he was in the business of buying and selling used property of various kinds, and he identified and explained his business records concerning the July 1978 sale. The July hub caps were not involved in the April hub cap transaction in any way.
It is clear that the petitioner would have “use” immunity under Section 914.04, Florida Statutes (1979) for his testimony but no “transactional” immunity for anything other than the July hub cap transaction. To gain “transactional” immunity the compelled testimony must be “relevant to and have substantial connection with the subject of inquiry”. State v. Kelly, 71 So. 2d 887, 894 (Fla.1954). This case is similar to the hypothetical discussed by the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Hough v. Popper, 287 So. 2d 282 (Fla.1973):
Thus if a person testifies under subpoena before a grand jury concerning an armed robbery in which he was a participant, and states in the course of his testimony that he drove his black Cadillac as the ‘getaway car,’ and it later is discovered that this car was driven by the witness in another, unconnected robbery, the statute provides the witness with complete immunity from prosecution for the robbery concerning which he testified, but only with use immunity as to the second, unconnected robbery. For this separate offense, the witness may be prosecuted; the statute, however, forbids the use of his compelled testimony in this prosecution even to establish the fact (innocent in and of itself) of ownership of the vehicle .
Id. at 284.
Petition for writ of prohibition is hereby DENIED.
COBB and UPCHURCH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Harris, 425 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…the witness in any criminal prosecution of him; the latter provides the witness with immunity from prosecution for the matter concerning which his testimony was elicited. State ex rel. Hough v. Popper, 287 So. 2d 282 (Fla.1973); Alford v. Cornelius, 380 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); State [*120] v. Toogood, 349 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). It is abundantly clear that a court of this state is powerless to provide a witness with transactional immunity over the State’s objection: first, because transactiona…
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McKAY v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 876 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…ty, however, does not prevent authorities from using the testimony to prosecute for other transactions. The statute at issue in this case once provided for both use/derivative use immunity and transactional immunity. See, e.g., Alford v. Cornelius, 380 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 5th DCA) (to gain transactional immunity, compelled testimony must be relevant and have substantial connection with the subject of the inquiry), rev. denied, 389 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1980). The statute was amended, and transactional immunity was n…
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State v. McSWAIN, 440 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…s declared section 914.04 to grant “derivative use” immunity and we, therefore, adhere to that precedent. The Third District Court of Appeal has reached the same conclusion in Novo v. Scott, 438 So. 2d 477 (Fla.3d DCA 1983); Cf. Alford v. Cornelius, 380 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Thus, if respondent’s compelled testimony leads to evidence that he committed another crime, he could not be prosecuted for that crime unless the prosecution could affirmatively “prove that the evidence it proposes to use is de…
Authorities Cited
- State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1954)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Robert Hough v. Honorable David Popper, 287 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1973)