MERRILL PADGETT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Padgett was charged with trafficking in stolen property under Florida law after purchasing items from undercover officers, though the items were not actually stolen. The court held that proof the goods were actually stolen is not essential to convict for 'endeavoring' to traffic in stolen property—the defendant's intent to purchase what he believed to be stolen property suffices.
Proof that the property is actually stolen is not an essential element of the crime of endeavoring to traffic in stolen property. The defendant's intent to purchase property he believed to be stolen, combined with an overt act manifesting that intent, constitutes the crime of endeavoring to traffic in stolen property under Section 812.019.
[1] An information charging endeavoring to traffic in stolen property is not subject to dismissal under Fla.R.Crim.P. …
[2] The crime of endeavoring to traffic in stolen property is complete upon proof of an overt act manifesting criminal intent, even if the property is not in fact stolen.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“proof of the stolen character of the goods was not an essential element of the crime of 'endeavoring' to traffic in stolen property”
The core holding—the trial court correctly ruled that actual theft of the goods is not required for conviction under the endeavoring statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePadgett purchased property from undercover police officers, believing the property to be stolen. The property was not actually stolen. Padgett was cha…
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ERVIN, Judge.
Padgett was charged with violating Section 812.019, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978), which makes it a crime to traffic in or endeavor to traffic in property which is known to be stolen or which the trafficker should know is stolen. Padgett moved to dismiss the information because the untraversed facts were that the property he purchased from undercover police officers was not stolen, although he thought it was stolen when he purchased it. The trial judge held that proof of the stolen character of the goods was not an essential element of the crime of “endeavoring” to traffic in stolen property, that “endeavor” in Section 812.019 means “attempt”,1 and that, notwithstanding Padgett’s mistake of fact which made the substantive crime of “trafficking in stolen property” impossible to commit, the state’s proof of Padgett’s intent to purchase stolen property was proof of the crime of “endeavoring” to traffic in stolen property.
We agree with the trial judge that proof of the stolen character of the goods was not essential to proof of the offense of endeavoring to traffic in stolen property. Section 812.019 was enacted in Chapter 77-342, Laws of Florida, as part of a broad revision of laws relating to theft and stolen property. Thus, the common law crime of “receiving stolen property” was replaced by the crime in Section 812.019, “dealing in stolen property.” That offense differs from the common law crime in degree of proof and as to the activities punished.2 At common law one could not be convicted of attempting to receive stolen property absent proof that the property was stolen. See Blakely and Goldsmith, Criminal Redistribution of Stolen Property: The Need For Law Reform, 74 Mich.L.Rev. 1512, 1552-1555 (1976); 28 Fla.Jur., Receiving Stolen Goods, §§ 2, 6 & 13 (Rev. ed. 1968). Florida law now clearly authorizes such attempt convictions under Sections 812.019 and 777.-04.
The conviction is AFFIRMED.
ROBERT P. SMITH, J., concurs.
BOOTH, J., specially concurs.
. Accord, State v. Tomas, 370 So. 2d 1142 (Fla.1979). Endeavor is defined as “an overt act manifesting criminal intent.” State v. Allen, 362 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla.1978); State v. Tomas, supra at 1143.
. In Lancaster v. State, 369 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), this court pointed out at least one difference between the crime in Section 812.019 and the common law crime of receiving stolen goods. The defendant in that case had admittedly purchased an engine which he knew was stolen. However, since the state had proven only that he had kept the engine which he had purchased, it had not shown he had “trafficked” in stolen goods, since Section 812.-012(7) defines “traffic” as “[t]o sell, transfer, distribute, dispense or otherwise dispose of property”, or “[t]o buy, receive ... or use property, with the intent to sell, transfer . etc.” We note that the record in this case fails to make any showing that Padgett bought the goods with the intent to sell them. However, that failure was not raised below or briefed on appeal.
BOOTH, Judge,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result in this case.
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Blackmon v. State, 121 So. 3d 535 (Fla. 2013)…ovisions relating to receiving stolen property. See Fla. S.Crim. Comm, on Judiciary, SB 1431 (1977) Staff Analysis (May 17, 1977). The dealing in stolen property statute replaced the common law crime of "receiving stolen property.” Padgett v. State, 378 So. 2d 118, 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). . "Obtains or uses” means: (1) "[tjaking or exercising control over property,” "[m]aking any unauthorized use, disposition, or transfer of property;” or "[o]btaining property by fraud, willful misrepresentation of a future…
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Hudson v. State, 408 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…However, we are dealing here with the statutory offense of “dealing” or “trafficking” in stolen property under Section [*227] 812.019, Florida Statutes, which differs from the old common law offense of “receiving stolen property.” Padgett v. State, 378 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The offense of dealing in stolen property is committed not merely by possessing stolen property knowing the same to be stolen, which was essentially the former offense of “receiving stolen property.” The offense of “dealing” in…
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State v. Rios, 409 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…ted by recent decisions of the First and Fourth District Courts of Appeal with which we are in complete agreement. State v. Cohen, 409 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (7 FLW 180); State v. Skinner, 397 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Padgett v. State, 378 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). It is further supported by the Model Penal Code § 5.01(a), supra; see also ALI, Model Penal Code § 5.01(a) Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 10, May 6, 1960), and the trend of the better reasoned modern authority on the subject. W. LaF…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Allen, 362 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1978)
- State v. Tomas, 370 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 1979)
- Lancaster v. State, 369 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)