SAMMIE LEE HARRIS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this probation revocation appeal, Harris challenges an order revoking his probation on two counts. The court held that while revocation on the arson charge was proper, revocation on the conspiracy charge was improper because Harris had never been placed on probation for that offense—he received an imprisonment sentence instead.
The court held that revocation of probation was improper as to Count I because Harris had never been placed on probation for that offense; he received a two-year imprisonment sentence instead. However, revocation was proper as to Count II (arson in the second degree) because the probation violation was clearly proven and the affidavit was filed before the original probation term expired.
[1] A court cannot revoke probation for an offense for which the defendant was not placed on probation.
[2] A probation revocation proceeding requires a valid predicate of probation to be in place.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Appellant had never been placed on probation as to Count I in the first instance. Instead, the court sentenced him to two years of imprisonment. The court had no predicate or basis upon which to proceed to conduct a revocation proceeding in this posture.”
Establishes the core issue: revocation requires that probation have been imposed, which did not occur for Count I
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHarris was charged in January 1972 with conspiracy to commit arson (Count I) and arson in the second degree (Count II). In May 1972, he pleaded guilty…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Probationary Employee Status cases and more on FLexlaw
NESBITT, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order of revocation of probation. Appellant contends that he had never been placed on probation for the particular offense and that entry of an order revoking such “probation” was in error. He further argues that the State failed to establish the violations of probation.
Appellant was informed against on January 20, 1972 by a two-count information charging him in Count I with conspiracy to commit arson and in Count II with arson in the second degree.
On May 15, 1972, he entered a plea of guilty to both counts of the information and was adjudged guilty. He received a two-year sentence as to Count I and a five-year probationary status as to Count II which was to commence at the expiration of his period of incarceration. Under the applicable and governing law then existing, the maximum penalty for the offense of conspiracy to commit arson was two and one-half years in the state penitentiary.1 The maximum penalty for the substantive offense, arson in the second degree, was ten years in the state penitentiary.2
On June 1,1978, an affidavit of probation violation was filed alleging, among other things, the appellant’s attempt to commit robbery and murder on May 15, 1978. The revocation hearing thereon was conducted on July 14, 1978 at which time testimony culpably implicating the appellant for the above violation was established. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered an order revoking appellant’s probation on both of the counts of the above information and sentenced him to two five-year sentences to run concurrently. This was error. Appellant had never been placed on probation as to Count I in the first instance. Instead, the court sentenced him to two years of imprisonment. The court had no predicate or basis upon which to proceed to conduct a revocation proceeding in this posture.
The court properly revoked appellant’s probation with respect to the offense of arson in the second degree since the affidavit of probation violation was filed before the expiration of the original term of probation. See Patrick v. State, 336 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). The violation was clearly proven.
Accordingly, the order of July 14, 1978 revoking appellant's probation for the offense of conspiracy to commit arson in the second degree is reversed with directions to vacate such sentence.
. § 833.04, Fla.Stat. (1969).
. § 806.02, Fla.Stat. (1969).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Pollock v. State, 417 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…rand larceny and unlawful possession of burglary tools in circuit court case no. 77-27207. The latter sentences are reversed as it is undisputed that the appellant Raymond A. Pollock was never placed on probation for these offenses. Harris v. State, 378 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The evidence presented below was otherwise more than sufficient to satisfy the conscience of the court that the defendant was in violation of his probation as charged; both direct and hearsay testimony, conced-edly admissible her…
-
Bowers v. State, 452 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…the court had no jurisdiction to revoke appellant’s probation, even if it could be said that appellant waived any requirement for an affidavit of violation and an arrest warrant. Pollack v. State, 417 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Harris v. State, 378 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). With respect to the argument concerning retention of jurisdiction, since the trial court erroneously revoked appellant’s purported probation in case No. 81-1122, there exists only the sentence of ninety-nine years in case No. 81…
Authorities Cited
- Verle Vernelle Patrick v. State, 336 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)