WILLIAM L. PHILLIPS, APPELLANT,
v.
BERNITA WERNER PHILLIPS, APPELLEE
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William Phillips appeals a dissolution of marriage judgment that awarded his ex-wife rehabilitative alimony plus contingent payments based on her future earned income, lump sum alimony, and attorney's fees. The court reversed the contingent income-based alimony provision as lacking legal basis, but affirmed the lump sum alimony and attorney's fees awards.
The contingent income-based alimony provision is reversed and stricken because it lacks legal basis and bears no relationship to the wife's actual needs or the husband's ability to pay. The awards of lump sum alimony and attorney's fees are affirmed as within the trial court's discretion. The case is remanded for the trial court to consider the parties' needs and abilities regarding appeal fees.
[1] An award of additional alimony payments contingent on the recipient spouse working is improper if it is not related to the recipient spouse's needs.
[2] An award of lump sum alimony is within the trial court's discretion.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The wife's entitlement to alimony depends on a showing of her need and husband's ability to pay.”
Establishes the legal standard for alimony awards that the trial court failed to apply to the contingent income payments.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the trial court awarded Mrs. Phillips rehabilitative alimony (not contested), plus additional monthly payment…
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PER CURIAM.
Mr. Phillips appeals from a final judgment of dissolution which provides that, in addition to the rehabilitative alimony awarded, husband is obligated to pay an amount equivalent to one-half of the income to be earned by the wife up to a maximum of $350 monthly for the first year, then $250 monthly for the second year. Appellant also contests the award of lump sum alimony in the form of one-half of the proceeds upon sale of a lot adjoining the marital home. Finally, Mr. Phillips appeals the award of attorney’s fees to the wife in the amount of $1,250. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
Neither party contests the adequacy of the rehabilitative alimony award. Appellant’s first point is solely concerned with the provision for additional payments to be made by the husband in the event the wife works. Although we appreciate the trial judge’s apparent attempt to offer the wife an incentive to work, there is no basis in law to make such an award at the expense of the husband. The wife’s entitlement to alimony depends on a showing of her need and husband’s ability to pay. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). The additional award had no relationship to the needs of the wife.
Accordingly, the provision of the final judgment awarding additional monies in the event the wife worked is stricken. The award of lump sum alimony and attorney’s fees was within the court’s discretion and we find no error or abuse of discretion. Appellee’s motion for allowance of fee money on appeal is provisionally granted and the case is remanded for the trial court to consider the parties’ needs and abilities to pay. Dresser v. Dresser, 350 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
McCORD, C. J., and BOOTH and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur.
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Wilmer Byrd v. Vearlan (Byrd) Minchew, 375 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)…343 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)', and cases cited therein. Appellee’s petition for appellate attorney’s fees is provisionally granted and the cause is remanded to the trial court to consider the parties’ needs and abilities. Phillips v. Phillips, 372 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). ERVIN, Acting C. J., and BOOTH and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.…
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Wright v. Wright, 372 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. Appellee’s petition for attorney’s fees is provisionally granted and the case is remanded for the trial court to set the amount in accordance with Dresser v. Dresser, 350 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Phillips v. Phillips, 372 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). McCORD, Acting C. J., and BOOTH and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur.…
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Nevin L. Wagner v. Maude W. Wagner, 374 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Appellee’s petition for appellate attorney’s fees is provisionally granted and the cause is remanded to the trial court [*630] to consider the parties’ needs and abilities to pay. Phillips v. Phillips, 372 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). ERVIN, Acting C. J., and BOOTH and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Manly W. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Peavy v. State, 350 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Dresser v. Dresser, 350 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)