DR. THEODORE S. BRANDWEIN, APPELLANT,
v.
PAUL M. GUSTMAN, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A medical doctor sued a fellow physician for defamation based on a committee report prepared in the defendant's capacity as chairman of a hospital staff subcommittee. The trial court dismissed the complaint under Florida's qualified privilege statute for medical review committee members, and the appellate court affirmed, holding the statute provided immunity absent a showing of malice or fraud.
The statute applies to the facts alleged, and the trial court properly dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. A member of a duly appointed medical review committee is immune from monetary liability and cause of action for damages when acting within the scope of committee functions without malice or fraud.
[1] A qualified privilege protects members of a medical review committee from liability for acts performed within the scope of their duties, provided they act without malice…
[2] A complaint alleging defamation against a member of a medical review committee is properly dismissed if it fails to allege facts demonstrating actual malice or fraud.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There shall be no monetary liability on the part of, and no cause of action for damages shall arise against, any member of a duly appointed medical review committee for any act or proceeding undertaken or performed within the scope of the functions of any such committee if the committee member acts without malice or fraud.”
States the statutory qualified privilege protecting medical review committee members from liability
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBoth parties were physicians on the staff of Miami-Dade General Hospital. The appellee served as chairman of a hospital subcommittee responsible for i…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Qualified Privilege cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The appellant is a medical doctor who was the plaintiff in a suit for defamation brought against the appellee who is also a medical doctor. Both doctors were members of the staff of the Miami-Dade General Hospital. The appellee was the chairman of a sub-committee of the hospital staff. The committee was charged with certain duties in acting upon complaints against members of the staff. After action by the appellee as the chairman of the committee, the appellant was granted a hearing before the Medical Executive Committee of the hospital and was suspended from privileges. Thereafter, the Governing Board of the hospital, acting after a hearing, affirmed the action of the Medical Executive Committee.
The appellant’s complaint in the circuit court sought damages against the appellee upon the ground that the appellee’s committee report was libelous. The appellee moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the report enjoyed a qualified privilege under Section 768.40(2), Florida Statutes (1977).1 The motion to dismiss was granted but appellant was afforded an opportunity to amend his complaint to state facts which, if proven, would show actual “malice or fraud.”
Appellant declined to amend, final judgment was entered and this appeal followed.
Appellant has presented us with four points and two sub-points on appeal. Nevertheless, we think that the single controlling question is whether the cited statute was applicable to the facts alleged in appellant’s complaint. We hold that the statute is applicable and that the trial judge properly dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. For the principles involved, see Abram v. Odham, 89 So. 2d 334 (Fla.1956).
Affirmed.
. “(2) There shall be no monetary liability on the part of, and no cause of action for damages shall arise against, any member of a duly appointed medical review committee for any act or proceeding undertaken or performed within the scope of the functions of any such committee if the committee member acts without malice or fraud. This immunity shall apply only to actions by providers of health services, and in no way shall this section render any medical review committee immune from any action in tort or contract brought by a patient or his successors or assigns. The provisions of this section do not affect the official immunity of an officer or employee of a public corporation.”