LYNN MICHAEL CAMBEST, APPELLANT,
v.
LYNN THOMSON NAGELEY CAMBEST, APPELLEE
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The court held that a settlement agreement's alimony provision was subject to modification without a showing of hardship, and the trial court erred in denying the petition based on an erroneous legal impression.
Appellant sought modification of alimony based on a settlement agreement. The trial court denied the petition, apparently believing hardship was a pre…
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KEHOE, Judge.
Appellant brings these consolidated appeals from the trial court’s orders denying his petition for modification of alimony and awarding appellee attorney’s fees and costs incurred as a result of the petition. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Among his points on appeal, appellant contends that he properly sought modification of the alimony provision contained in a settlement agreement between the parties and that, in denying his petition for modification of alimony, the trial court relied upon an erroneous impression of the applicable law.
Based upon our review of the record in this cause, we are in agreement with the contentions of appellant set forth above. The settlement agreement, in regard to its provisions for alimony was properly subject to modification. Further, it was unnecessary as a condition for such modification that appellant show any hardship. Other factors may be present in a situation which permit the modification without such a showing. See, e. g., Friedman v. Friedman, 366 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); and Craig v. Craig, 298 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). Accordingly, because the trial court in the exercise of its discretion denied appellant’s petition based upon an erroneous impression of the applicable law, we must reverse the order denying the petition and remand the cause for further consideration in the light of this opinion.
We find no error in the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs to appel-lee; therefore, the order awarding such sums is affirmed. See, e. g., Herzog v. Herzog, 346 So. 2d 56 (Fla.1977).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
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Braswell v. Braswell, 881 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…provision is for support or whether it is a property settlement payment, there are certain characteristics to consider. . For instance, according to section 61.14, Florida Statutes (2001), a support award is modifiable. See also Cambest v. Cambest, 367 So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). A property settlement provision, however, is non-modifiable, regardless of the parties’ financial positions, when the agreements are incorporated into the final judgments of dissolution of marriage. See Langer v. Langer, 463…
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Johnson v. Johnson, 403 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…at the award be made to the prevailing party. Therefore, where the relative financial circumstances of the contestants justify it, even the losing party may be awarded a fee. Diaco v. Diaco, 363 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). See Cambest v. Cambest, 367 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Here, Dr. Johnson could well afford to pay the fee, and there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that it would strain Mrs. Johnson’s resources for her to do so. Thus, we will not disturb the award of attorney’s fees. We reve…
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Ender Oguz v. Olyar Oguz, 478 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…ent. Such agreements are commonly entered into by parties prior to entry of a final judgment of dissolution, and they may or may not be incorporated in a final decree. See Coffin v. Coffin, 368 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); cf. Cambest v. Cambest, 367 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979). Failure to incorporate a settlement agreement in the final decree does not make it unenforceable.5 In fact, an unreferenced contract may control the provisions of a final judgment. See Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So. 2d 281 (Fla.…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Herzog v. Herzog, 346 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1977)
- Friedman v. Friedman, 366 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Modesto Bisono v. State, 333 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Craig v. Catharine S. Craig, 298 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)