LYMON O'STEEN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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O'Steen, committed as a mentally disordered sex offender, sought release after completing treatment at one facility. The court held that because additional beneficial treatment was available at another facility within the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the statutory criteria for discharge were not met, and recommitment was required.
O'Steen did not meet the statutory criteria for discharge because available treatment that might benefit him remained within the department, even though it required transfer to another facility. Therefore, the trial court was required to recommit O'Steen rather than discharge him.
[1] A mentally disordered sex offender is not eligible for discharge if beneficial treatment remains available within the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, ev…
[2] A court must recommit a mentally disordered sex offender if the department has not exhausted all available treatment options.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The testimony at the hearing clearly revealed that treatment which might be beneficial to the appellant was available within the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, although such treatment would require the transfer of the appellant to another facility.”
Establishes that availability of beneficial treatment at another facility prevents discharge
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceO'Steen was adjudged a mentally disordered sex offender on December 7, 1976, pursuant to Florida law. The clinical director of the North Florida Evalu…
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PER CURIAM.
O’Steen was adjudged to be a mentally disordered sex offender pursuant to Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1975), on December 7, 1976. The committing court was notified by the clinical director of the North Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center that O’Steen had undergone complete evaluation and treatment and that, as reported in the clinical summary, he had reached full benefits and was ready for return to the court’s jurisdiction. At the hearing on January 20, 1978, the court relied upon the letter and the clinical summary as concluding that' treatment had been exhausted. However, the clinical summary recommended that O’Steen be transferred to South Florida State Hospital and be placed in a particular program which would be more suitable for treating O’Steen. Therefore, we find this case is controlled by Washington v. State, 355 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) wherein this court stated:
The testimony at the hearing clearly revealed that treatment which might be beneficial to the appellant was available within the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, although such treatment would require the transfer of the appellant to another facility. Thus the testimony showed that the department had not exhausted all treatment for the appellant, and therefore the appellant did not meet the statutory criteria for discharge. Under these circumstances, the court was required to recommit the appellant pursuant to Section 917.20, Florida Statutes.
Therefore, the sentence imposed by the trial court is vacated and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MILLS, Acting C. J., and SMITH and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Cummings v. State, 379 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)…that all available treatment had been exhausted, the court scheduled a hearing on pending matters but refused an evidentiary hearing and proceeded to sentencing. Citing Washington v. State, 355 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and O’Steen v. State, 366 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), in which evidentiary hearings were had by the court, Cummings urges that he also is entitled to controvert and adduce proof refuting the Department’s decision that it has exhausted all available treatment. We affirm. While an e…
Authorities Cited
- Washington v. State, 355 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)