GENERAL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE CO., APPELLANT,
v.
W. I. STINSON, JR., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
General American Life Insurance Company appealed a trial court judgment finding that the decedent, Mrs. Stinson, was covered under a group life insurance policy at the time of her death despite not working the required 30 hours per week. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the insurer had waived any objection to her eligibility through its agents' knowledge of her status at policy inception.
The trial court properly found that Mrs. Stinson was covered under the policy at the time of her death. The insurer's agents had actual knowledge of Mrs. Stinson's status as an employee who did not work 30 hours per week at the time the policy was issued, and therefore the insurer waived any objection to her eligibility.
[1] An insurer may waive objections to an insured's eligibility for coverage if the insurer's agent has knowledge of the insured's status at the inception of the policy and t…
[2] An agent's knowledge of an insured's eligibility status, acquired during the application process, is imputed to the insurer.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“although she was a stockholder and didn't spend all of her time in the thirty hours a week, which is usually required in the office actually doing work in the store he agreed that she was active”
Establishes that the General American agent knew of Mrs. Stinson's status and nevertheless agreed she was eligible for coverage
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGeneral American issued a group life insurance policy covering Fisher Hardware Company. Mrs. Stinson was a stockholder and employee of the company but…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Apparent Authority cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
General American contends the trial court erred in finding that appellee’s decedent was covered under one of its group life policies at the time of her death. Its primary contention is that the decedent, Mrs. Stinson, was not covered at her death because she no longer met one of the eligibility requirements for coverage, i. e. she no longer worked 30 hours per week in the business insured by the policy, Fisher Hardware Company. Appellee argues that Mrs. Stinson worked no more or less in the business at the time of her death than she did when the policy was issued, that appellant’s agents were aware of Mrs. Stinson’s status from the inception of the policy, and therefore, that appellant had waived any objection to her eligibility. After a thorough review of the rather obscure record presented on the issue, we find support for appel-lee’s position and affirm.
The record reveals that Mary Harris, an agent for the company which had previously insured the business, contacted General American about insuring Fisher Hardware after her company dropped its coverage. General American sent an agent to DeFun-iak Springs to write the coverage and a conversation took place between its agent, Mary Harris, and appellee, the President of the company. Mary Harris’ deposition testimony about the conversation was as follows:
We were discussing, [whether Mrs. Stinson was eligible] . . . and I sat there until I found out he [the agent] thought he could cover them, the eligibility requirements, and although she was a stockholder and didn’t spend all of her time in the thirty hours a week, which is usually required in the office actually doing work in the store he agreed that she was active. I told him that she . . was considered an employee at that time and she was considered eligible at that time.
Q. Yes ma’am. You understood then at the time that the policy was secured, her capacity as an employee of the store. A. That’s right. He called me and asked me, he called me telephone and said, ‘What do you think about the mother’ and I said — the representative said that he could cover her, that she was eligible and that’s the last I had to do with it.” We believe this testimony supplies adequate proof that appellant’s agent, as well as Mary Harris, the apparent agent, had sufficient notice of Mrs. Stinson’s status as an employee of Fisher Hardware before it issued the policy to support the result reached by the trial court here. The judgment is therefore AFFIRMED.
McCORD, C. J., and ERVIN and MELVIN, JJ., concur.