RICKY HELTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ricky Helton appeals his sexual battery conviction, arguing that testimony about a prior alleged sexual assault was improperly admitted in violation of the rule against character evidence. The court agrees, finding the prior offense testimony irrelevant to either identity or consent, and reverses for a new trial.
The court reversed the conviction, holding that the prior crime testimony was inadmissible because it was not relevant to either identity or consent. The lack of consent of one person cannot prove the lack of consent of another, and the evidence did not fit within the parameters of admissibility under the Williams rule.
[1] Evidence of a prior crime is inadmissible to prove consent in a subsequent sexual battery case, as consent is an individual matter.
[2] Evidence of a prior crime is inadmissible to prove identity in a subsequent sexual battery case when the similarities between the incidents are minimal and the dissimilar…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The issue of consent is unique to an individual, and the lack of consent of one person is not proof of the lack of consent of another.”
Establishes the core principle that evidence of prior non-consent cannot be used to prove lack of consent in a separate transaction
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHelton was charged with sexual battery after allegedly abducting a woman to a wooded area, hitting and choking her, and forcing her to perform sexual …
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PER CURIAM.
Ricky Helton appeals from a conviction for sexual battery with force likely to cause serious personal injury on the grounds that testimony concerning another offense violated the rule set forth in Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.1959). We agree and reverse.
The alleged victim of the crime charged testified that she was abducted and taken to a wooded area. There Helton hit her, choked her, threw her to the ground and forced her to perform various sexual acts. Subsequently, she was able to get away and she ran out to the highway nude and was picked up by a passing motorist.
At trial another woman was allowed to testify, over objection of the defense, to an alleged attempted sexual battery involving the appellant at another time. Helton had been tried on that charge and had been convicted of simple battery. She stated that she knew appellant and he had asked her for a ride home from work. He directed her to a wooded area and then grabbed the keys out of the car and told her that he was going to rape her. They struggled, he pushed her out of the car, and she began screaming. He then pushed her to the ground, sat on her, and, when she refused to take off her pants, ripped them off. After he pulled her to her feet, he pushed her away and said, “Run before I kill you.” At that time she saw a car coming, and she ran to the car screaming and waving her arms. The car contained two guards from a nearby military station who had heard her screams and they rescued her. The only similarities between the two incidents are that they occurred in wooded areas, the victims allegedly did not consent to the encounters, and the victim in each case hailed a passing car for help. There are numerous dissimilarities.
The state offered the testimony of the previous crime as relevant to identity, but the court accepted it as relevant to consent. The issue of consent is unique to an individual, and the lack of consent of one person is not proof of the lack of consent of another. Evidence of the previous crime committed by Helton does not fit within the parameter of admissibility under the rule in Williams either as. evidence of consent or identity because it was not relevant to either. REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial.
McCORD, C. J., and ERVIN and MELVIN, JJ., concur.
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Williams v. State, 621 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1993)…KOGAN, Justice. We have for review Williams v. State, 592 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), because of apparent conflict with Hodges v. State, 403 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), review denied, 413 So. 2d 877 (Fla.1982); and Helton v. State, 365 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 373 So. 2d 461 (Fla.1979), on the issue of whether similar fact evidence is admissible to rebut a defense of consent in a sexual battery case. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida C…
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Sias v. State, 416 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…uniqueness where the area of the city where the crime occurred, the manner in which the sexual assaults and the taking of money were accomplished, and the attitude of the assailants towards the victims were dissimilar. Likewise, in Helton v. State, 365 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), a showing that in both crimes the female victim was abducted, taken to a wooded area where sexual acts were compelled or attempted, and where ultimately the victim escaped and hailed a passing car, was held insufficient to admit…
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Joseph v. State, 447 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…l as to be found in a vast number of like crimes, render the evidence of the collateral crimes irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible, to establish the identity of the accused. See Davis v. State, 376 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Helton v. State, 365 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Banks v. State, 298 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Davis v. State, 276 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973); Franklin v. State, 229 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of conviction and remand the caus…
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- Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959)